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ABSTRACT
Despite the enormous changes in the basic institutions
and social structures of Iranian society and the introduction
of modern technology and means of mass communications, many
traditional structures, especially those related to the social
behavior and social communication of individuals are still
functioning in Iran. These traditional institutions and stru-
ctures not only have survived the process of change, but they
have assumed a revived role in contemporary Iranian society
because the effective institutions of social and politicnl
association and communication are absent. A "dowreh" is an
informal group of individuals who enter into an intimate,
closed-to-others relationship. This group activity is consi-
dered to be on a permanent basis, even if the group disinteg-
rates after a short period of time. The members of group
meet periodically, usually rotating the meeting place among
the membership. As a common norm a dowreh meets weekly but
some may meet only twice a month, others less often. The
group which constitutes a dowreh is a small group, because
the usual number of people in any single dowreh does not ex-
ceed 20 and it is more often about 8 to 15. The more, con-
crete, recognizable feature of a dowreh is it communicative
aspect since the participants use it to discuss, organize and
communicate with each other. Clearly, the functions of dow-
reh as a small group activity are not limited to these. Du-
ring the course of this investigation we shall observe that
each type of dowreh fulfills different personal and social
functions for its membership.
The socio-political significance of dowreh lies in the
fact that it is not an isolated phenomenon. The indefinite
number of cells of small group informal association are inter-
related and interconnected to each other. Rarely an indivi-
dual confines himself to the membership in one dowreh. The
majority, particularly those who are socially or politically
active, will go to more than two dowrehs each week. In each
single dowreh they assume a different social role and enter
into a different type of small group association. What they
carry invariably, however, is their information; the social,
economic and political information that is transmitted to them
through their communication with their group. Thus, each in-
dividual becomes the linkage between several small group ce-
lls, and a social network of dowrehs is created. This social
network covers most of the social strata and cuts across di-
fferent classes. Our research, however, concludes that dow-
reh is essentially an urban phenomenon and it can not be said
that such network pervades rural areas of the country too.
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INTRODUCTION
Some of the recent anthropological and sociological re-
searches into the dynamism of social relationships among in-
dividuals and communities in non-industrialized societies ha-
ve opened up new possibilities for political scientists for
understanding and explaining the dynamism of the political
systems in developing countries. Relying upon the findings
of anthropologists and using their terminology and research
tools, the political scientist no longer need limit himself
to the observation and explanation of more concrete, formal
institutions and structures of the government in the society
under investigation. Guided by the group theory of politics,
but going far beyond its assumptions, he attempts at finding
and explaining the more hidden, informal structures and rela-
tionships that exist in these societies and among the indivi-
dual members. By doing so, he assumes that the operation of
politics in such societies is basically through networks of
interpersonal relationships that cut across boundaries of cla-
1
ss, status and group formations.
We do not intend here to explain this approach or to base
OUy research upon its specific assumptions. What is of signi-
ficance for our study however, is one of their fundamental
1- See, for instance, Marc J. Swartz, ed., Local Level Politics
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co, 1969), and Steffen W.
Schmidt, James C. Scott, Carl Lande, Laura Guasti, eds.,
Friends, Followers and Factions, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977)
political findings, which is the hypothesis that the opera-
tion of politics in non-industrialized countries is essen-
tially through informal social and political structures and
networks of interpersonal relationships.
A notable political scientist, with a different approach
to political development, has reached the same conclusion
sometimes earlier in his studies of the developing countries.1
Fred W.Riggs points out that it is necessary for the politi-
cal development theories to make the proper distinction bet-
ween "formal" and "informal" structures constituting the po-
litical system of a developing country. While rejecting the
approach based exclusively on the dichotomies of traditional-
modern, diffuse-specific, and ascribed-voluntary, as oversim-
plified, he asserts that in order to conceptualize transitio-
nal societies one must consider such "pattern variables" as
polar extremes rather than as dichotomies. Then, the impor-
tant question which will arise is "which kind of group would
play the most significant role in politics?" In Riggs' view,
the model developed by Gabriel Almond and adopted by other
theorists fails to provide the correct answer to this ques-
tion. Because, he observes, we have inputs which do not lead
to rule-making and rules which are often not implemented,
there is a need for a different model from Almand'S:
1- Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Developing Politics." World
Politics 16 (1963): 147-171, and Fred W. Riggs, Adminis-
tration in Developin Countries, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co, 1964)
"We need a two-tiered model, a system which
distinguishes between 'formal' and 'effective'
structures, between what is prescribed ideally
and what actually happens." 1
The Almond's model, Riggs maintains, applies at the for-
mal level, but at the effective level what is required is a
model which contains "a congeries of relatively autonomous or
self-sustained units." 2 Each of these units can fulfill all
the functions necessary for its survival, including the poli-
tical function. When other structures arise for channelling
and legitimating the functions of these units through central
organs of government, these functions become politically dis-
tinguishable for the system as a whole. Consequently, tradi-
tional Indian society, for instance, was composed of "a com-
posite of self-governing primary units: its familial, caste,
village, tribal and other such groupings." 3 In such society
the functions of formal government were minimal. Therefore,
in Riggs' view, the formal apparatus of government in socie-
ties like India, is "superimposed" on a structure of decen-
tralized, autonomous political cells which are not dissolved
by the process of modernization, although they are disrupted
and twisted by it.
"The superimposed formal apparatus of modern
government, with its rule-making functions,
seeks with only partial success to break
through innumerable substructures of autonomous
political life which neither feed inputs effec-
tively into the superstructure, nor absorb
its regulatory outputs. Such substructures are
effective polities in their own right." 4
1- Riggs, The Theory of DevelopingPolitics P. 154
2- Ibid.
3- Ibid.
4- Ibid.
8In other words, it seems that a dualism exists in the
operation of politics in the developing countries. On the
one hand there are the "formal" apparatus of government and
official organization of political power which create a re-
semblance of rationally developed political institutions and
impersonal bureaucracy for the management of power and autho-
rity. Consequently, these societies have the appearance of a
democratic, pluralistic political system, with the required
structures, organizations and legal procedures such as cons-
titutions, patties, parliaments, interest groups, associa-
tions, etc. On the other hand, the actual operation of po-
litical system does not take place through these democratic
channels and legal procedures. The operation of the politi-
cal system is essentially through "informal", non-official
channels. In most cases in developing societies, the coun-
try is ruled by one man and/or a group of traditional ruling
elite, whose source of power and legitimacy does not emanate
from, or depend upon, the formal organizations and structure
of government. The participation in the political system of
these countries is limited to certain groups, the relation.
ships among those involved in the politics are personal, the
management of power and authority through bureaucratic appa-
ratus is not impersonal and rational, and access to political
positions is possible only for those who can succeed in pa-
ssing through the hierarchy of personal relationships, fami-
ly cliques, and "patron-client" alliances.
This dualism in the dynamism of political system, is one
9
of the basic features of Iranian political system according
to many of the empirical studies of the country. On the one
hand, Iranian political system is formally structured on the
basis of a consitution modelled after Belgian constitution
and adopted after the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911.
This constitution not only implies the rationality and imper-
sonality of the organizations of government and emphasizes
the separation of powers into three independent branches of
legislative, judicial and executive, but it specifies and des-
cribes clearly the proper domain of each power, the imperso-
nal procedures of the management of the power, and the pro-
ceedings of election and formation of parliaments (a House of
Representatives and a Senate). Formally, the constitution
specifies that the monarch is the head of the executive bra-
nch, but his power is limited so that his status may be re-
garded more as a symbol like the status of the monarch in
Great Britain. The effective power of decision-making is as-
cribed by constitution to a cabinet headed by a prime minis-
ter. The executive branch is responsible not to the monarch
but to the two Houses. Consequently, the real authority and
powe-r must rest in the two Houses whose members are chosen by
the vote of the majority of people being cast through free
election.
On the other hand, the actual operation of the Iranian
political system and the real management of power and deci-
sion making do not take place through thpse formal institu-
tions of government and as a result the fundamental laws of
10
constitution are not observed and followed. Since Reza Shah
derosed the Qajar dynasty in 1925, established the Pahlavi dy-
nasty and crowned himself as the monarch of Iran until his ab-
dication in 1941 by allied forces, he was able to ignore the
constitution completely, to rule as a dictator and to control
legislative and judiciary branches of government. In 1953,
after a short period of democracy in the country, his son re-
turned to Iran from Italy with the assistance of the United
States and he also began to rule as a traditional authorita-
rian monarch, ignoring the formal and leg'al institutions of
government.
It seems clear that any attempt to explain the operation
of politics in Itan must consider this dual aspect of the po-
litical system, since the explanation and understanding of
the process of political change can not be comprehensive if
one neglects the informal structures through which the actual
process of politics takes place. This is particularly impor-
tant in the case of countries such as Iran because the dis-
rupting force of modernization process has not transformed
the traditional structures of the political system. What are
these structures? Why formal institutions do not function
properly in Iran? Why do trhe informal structures and group
associations assume major political roles?
This study does not attempt to answer all of these ques-
tions. It is an attempt at the identification and analysis
of a socio-political phenomenon in Iran which is one of the
major structures of "informal politics" and consequently an
important substructure of the political system as a whole.
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This socio-political phenomenon is called "dowreh" in Persian,
which can be translated as "circle" in English. Yet, as it
will be shown during the course of investigation, there is not
an exact English equivalent for "dowreh," perhaps because the
phenomenon itself does not exist in English-speaking socie-
ties such as Britain and the U.S.
There are only two published papers about this phenomen-
on in recent English literature on political development in
Iran. The first pioneering study which is full of fresh
ideas and insights, is the two articles by William Green
Miller.1 The second, more theoretical investigation is by
James A. Bill and is an attempt to explain the phenomenon in
a larger context of political analysis and theory with a spe-
cific developmental approach. 2
As it will be discussed later, dowreh is a socio-politi-
cal phenomenon, It is a social phenomenon and therefore sub-
ject to sociological research, to the extent that it functio-
ns as a means for group association, identification and acti-
vity regardless of any specific political interest. It is a
political phenomenon, and therefore subject to political stu-
dy, to the extent that it functions as an instrument to com-
municate, establish personal relationships and form alliances
to gain access to power positions; or to exert power on oth-
ers; or to influence their political attitudes, behavior and
1- William Green Miller, "Political Organization in Iran: From
Dowreh to Political Party," The Middle East Journal, 23
(Spring, 1969): 159-167, and The Middle East Journal,
(Summer, 1969): 343-350
2- James A. Bill, "The Plasticity of Informal Politics: The
Case of Iran" The Middle East Journal (Spring, 1973)
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decisions; or to achieve certain political ends. Furthermore,
dowreh is not only a structure, but actually an amalgam of in-
dividuals associating through patterns of personal relation-
ships. This direct, face-to-face personal contact which exi-
sts between the members constitutes the core of its structure
and transforms it into an informal but very effective system
of communication. The communicational feature of dowreh in-
creases its political significance and therefore, makes it
more relevant for political study.
Ideally this research should have been focussed on the
analysis of the political nature, political functions and po-
litical configurations of dowreh phenomenon. Yet, there are
many difficulties in the way of an empirical political inves-
tigation in a country such as Iran. Thus, for the present
time, I have had to devote most of my research to a sociolo-
gical study of the phenomenon, even though I shall attempt at
giving a political explanation too. To achieve a better un-
derstanding of the ways in which a dowreh functions, the best
method seemed to be participant observation. Thus, not only
I use an informal language to describe my records of partici-
pating in different dowrehs, but specifically for this resea-
rch I became a guest member of some of my family's and frien-
ds' dowrehs during a limited period of time last summer, while
I was in Iran. Moreover, to complete my research, I proceed-
ed with other methods. A larhe number of individuals I perso-
nally know were members of different dowrehs. Through them I
was acle to contact with other elite and non-elite Iranians
13
who participate regularly in various dowrehs. In this way, I
could manage to conduct in-depth interviews using open-ended
questions with a relatively large sample of individuals. How-
ever, since it was not possible for me to choose my sample
through the application of empirical quantitative methods, I
do not know whether there was enough representation from all
segments and strata of Iranian society in my sample. For one
purpose, however, the sample seemed sufficient, that is to
identify the phenomenon properly and to draw general distin-
guishing lines of its structure. And because dowreh is esse-
ntially an urban phenomenon, it seems those individuals whom
I interviewed could provide me with enough empirical data for
socio-political anaysis.
14
2
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
To understand the significance of dowreh network in the
political system of Iran, we begin with outlining the major
characteristics of the political system. Since, as we ob-
serv d earlier, dowreh is a sub-structure of overall Iranian
political structure.
a)Historical Background:
Political and social change in contemporary Iran has passed
through four different historical phases. The first period
is the period of constitutional revolution in Iran from 1905
to 1911. The constitutional revolution was the first popular
movement in modern history of Iran, and while it did not suc-
ceed to transform the institution of monarchy, one of its ma-
jor impacts on the political structure was the legal limita-
tions it imposed on the absolute monarchical role. The cons-
titutional revolution gave Iran a constitutional structure
which at least in theory, for the first time in the long his-
tory of Iran, limited the powers of the monarch and provided
for the representative democratic government. The fundamental
laws of the constitution were conceived to introduce a parlia-
mentary system like European constitutional monarchies into
Iran. Unlike the past when the authority of the king was derived
from God and religion, the constitution declared the "whole
people" as the "source of authority". The chosen members of
parliament were described as representing "the whole people",
and unlike the monarch, they were given extensive powers. They
15
acquired the right to approve, disapprove, or modify all laws,
concessions to foreigners, loans and budgets. They could in-
vestigate any "matter conductive to the well-being of the
government and the people"; they were guaranteed two-year term
free of arrest, dissolution, recess or dismissal. The monarch,
retained only nominal prerogatives as the Head of the State.
Sovereignty was defined as a trust confided by the people to
the person of the king. His "person" was invested with the
supreme command of the armed forces,and ministers were both
appointed and dismissed through his "Royal Decrees". But, the
constitution stressed the "responsibility" of executive branch
of government to the representatives of people in a number of
qualifying clauses: "Ministers cannot divert themselves of res-
ponsibility to parliament by pleading verbal or written ins-
tructions from the king"; "if parliament, by an absolute majo-
rity, declares itself dissatisfied with the cabinet or with
one particular minister, that cabinet or minister shall resign"
and "ministers, besides being individually responsible for their
ministry are also collectively responsible to parliament for
one another's action in affairs of more general character." The
king, however, retained one important source of power, in addi-
tion to being the supreme eommand of the armed forces, which
was the right to appoint half the senators to an npper house,
which was intended to moderate the extensive rights of depu-
ties in the lower house of parliament.
1- Ervand Abrahamian "Communism and Communalism in Iran: The
Tudeh and the Firgah-i-Dimukrat" The International Journal
of the Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 1, (1970), PP. 23-24
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It is clear that enforcement of such a constitution would
have transformed the nature of political system in Iran. But
the hopes of constitutionalists were ruined by subsequent turn
of events. In less than 15 years, the constitution became a
historical piece of paper, and the entire political system re-
gained its traditional characteristics. In 1907, a major threat
to the survival of nation occured when Britain and Russia, who
have been the main international antagonists for a generation,
now put aside their global differences, because of their mutual
fear of Germany, signed an Entente. As a part of their inter-
national agreement, Iran was divided into three geographical
zones: the north was defined as within Russia's sphere of in-
fluence, the south within Britain's and the central provinces
were left as a neutral zone. Two years later, the Russian
military occupied their sphere. And as the First World War
came to the Middle East, Ottoman troops invaded Azerbaijan,the
northern province of Iran, and German agents infiltrated tribal
reqions in the central provinces, and British officers in their
zone formed the South Persia Rifles.
By the end of the war Iran was in the process of disinteg-
ration and chaos. The northern province of Azerbaijan had its
own Azeri-speaking government. Another northern province,
Gilan, with the help of the Red Army, had declared itself a
Soviet Socialist Republic. In the western part, Kurdistan was
a battlefield between Assyrians and Kurds. In the south,
Arabestan -later named Khuzistan- had changed its traditional
1- Ibid.
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autonomy into virtual independence with its own Arab Sheikh.
Also in the south, Sistan and Baluchistan were more or less
autonomous regions ruled by local tribal chieftains. The cen-
tral parts of the country were the domain of the Bakhtiyari
tribes in Isfahan, and Qashqai and Khamesh tribes in Fars.
The second period in modern history of Iran begins with
the arrival of colonel Reza Khan, the commander of a brigade
of Cossacks, in Tehran and his subsequent coup d'etat in 1925.
Arriving in Tehran he deposed the cabinet, named himself sup-
reme army commander and helped in the formation of a new cabi-
net. He, then, convinced the British that he was Iran's last
hope of salvation from Bolshevism and acquired the Soviet
Union's support by promising them to implement a treaty of
neutrality. Once he could achieve the withdrawal of British
and Russian troops from Iran, he ousted the prime minister and
gained eontrol of the rural gendarmerie and the urban police
by having transformed from the interior ministry to his own
ministry of war. He successfully subdued the various tribal
and provincial rebels, and gradually transformed the decentra-
lized contingents of local levies, cossack brigades, and the
South Persia Rifles into a centralized army. In 1925, having
monopolized the control of all armed forces, he deposed the
ruling Qajar dynasty and founded the new Pahlavi dynasty. Reza
Shah ruled Iran until 1941. He was a modernizing dictator,
whose program of "nation building" was based upon the creation
of a large organizationally modern army, and a modern bureauc-
racy, both of which intended to strengthen the process of
18
centralization of the government. Not only he instituted the
national conscription and increased the military budget and
enlarged the size of the army, but he utilized the oil reve-
nue to restructure bureaucracy, Very early in his reign, he
ignored the constitution. Disregarding elections, he chose
the deputies of parliament himself and thus, "parliament
ceased to be the central institution of the state and instead
became a screen hiding the nakedness of militarism with the
decorous formality of constitutionalism."1 Reza Shah's reign
came to an end with the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in
August 1941, when he was forced to abdicate.
The third period begins with the new monarch Mohammad
Reza Shah, who assumed power after his father's abdication.
The young Shah had to give many concessions to the opposi-
tion. From 1943 until 1953, Iran experienced a decade of
democracy and for a second time there was a true parliamentary
system in Iran, "however influenced by old families, cliques,
and rivalries."2 Internationally, the rivalry among great
powers to gain influence in Iran started again. When Russian
troops did not withdraw from northern region of Iran, the
United States interfered and forced. the withdrawal of Soviet
troops. From this period, the U.S. increasingly took over
the role played by Great Britain in Iran. Internally, Iran
was experiencing the effects of modernizing policies initiated
1- Ibid., P. 26
2- Nikki R. Keddie "The Iranian Power Structure and Social
Change 1800-1969: An Overview" International Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 2, (1971) P. 11
by Reza Shah. There were for the firs't time, mass idealogi-
cal parties becoming involved in struggle for power. Among
these parties two became politically significant; the co-
mmunist Tudeh party with large portions of the working class
and radical intellectuals among its membership, and National
Front, with the support of nationalist middle classes. "For
all the shifts and opportunism shown by some involved in the
struggles of this period, the issues were real and many Ira-
nians devoted themselves to the cause of achieving full na-
tional independence."i When the popular prime minister, Dr.
Mossadegh, nationalized the British controlled oil, the whole
country supported this move. However, the boycott of the
country's oil by British government led to the near bankrupt-
cy of the economy, and subsequently the government was over-
thrown by an American assisted coup d'etat. 2
From 1953, the fourth period begins with the return of
Mohammad Reza Shah to Iran and the active American involve-
ment in the reorganization of Iranian military. During this
period the political system has regained its traditional cha-
racteristics. So far, the present Shah has continued the
acceleration of previous processes of centralization and mi-
litarization. Like his father , his dictatorship is concomi-
tant with reforms, initiated in 1963 with land reform.
In all these four periods, certain aspects of the opera-
tion of politics in Iran have remained unchanged. These
1- Ibid.
2- Ibid., See also Richard W. Cottam Nationalism in Iran
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964)
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aspects help to explain why the informal substructures such
as dowreh are essential in the operation of political system
in Iran. Briefly these are:
-The encroachment of the executive branch of government on the
legislative and judicial branches.
-The ineffectiveness of constitution, and the process of ruling
by decrees.
-The accmulation and concentration of power in the hands of
the monarch, his absolute control over the army, bureaucracy
and foreign policy.
-The creation and maintenance of a priviledged, expanding army
apparatus, its encroachment on civilian operations of the
state, and its assumption of the functional role of preserving
monarchy.
-The creation and expansion of a secret police, with the func-
tional role of preserving monarchy through the use of every
possible means.
-The existence of an ineffective, decorative parliament. The
king handpicks each member of the ruling elite.
-The containment of social tensions mainly by repression and
the use of terror
Under the two kings all forms of political association
and organization were banned. Reza Shah even did not trust
a loyal party to be formed. Not only labor has not been
allowed to organize and strikes have been dealt with harshly,
but the formation of forial interest groups has not been po-
ssible. The present king in 1975 declared the dissolution of
21
all existing political organizations and formed his National
Ressurection Party (Rastakhiz). The party was hoped to be an
"instrument for mobilizing the masses in the service of monar-
chy". For a year the membership of this party was obligatory
for all. Then, the membership was a prerequisite for working
in any bureaucratic organization in the country. From 1963
until recent crisis all newspapers, journals and magazines were
banned except three government subsidized and controlled news-
papers and some of their other publications. The censorship
was not limited to these publications and books, everything
publishable must be approved prior to publication.
b) The Characteristics of the Political System:
The recent empirical studies, particularly those by James
Bill and Mprvin Zonis show that the Iranian political system
operates mainly through informal structures. Bill observes
that the exercise of power in Iran is played out primarily
within networks of informal groups. "Factions, coteries and
ad hoc collectivities of all sorts are the kind of group for-
mations that count in Iran."I He observes that the political,
social, economic and technical conditions of organization are
absent in Iran and a stifling political environment has obs-
tructed the growth of formal associations and has promoted
instead thr proliferation of secretive, less visible formal
groups. Thus, a web of informality exists, at the heart of
which the Shah is located. There is an intense competition
te gain the ear of the king. And consequently, the king
1- James Bill, Op Cit , P. 132
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sorrounds himself with confidents who serve as charnels of
access. "These individuals include ministers, generals, cour-
tiers, statesmen and senators. They also include relatives,
personal friends, old classmates and trusted advisors. These
personalities 'who circle the power of the monarch' filter and
relay infermations and --petitions to the Shah. They, in turn,
are sorrounded by their own entourages each member of whom
serves as a lower level but additional channel to power. This
network of personal webs is in constant flux and Iranian peti-
tioners develop ingeuity and expend energy in efforts to gain
a firm foothold in it."1
Intimately interrelated with the informality of the exer-
cise of power in Iran is what Bill terms as "personalism,
omnipresent tension, and insecurity".2 "There is a conspicuous
absence of formal institutions embodying well defined princi-
ples of goal attainment and cooperative effort. Power has not
flowed from institution to institution but rather from indivi-
dual to individual." 3 Thus, a complex web of personal relation-
ships, channels the concentration and distribution of power.
As we repeatedly mentioned, one of the characteristics of
the Iranian political system is that it is structured on the
balance of tension. There is a pervasive rivalry and conflict
at all levels of the system. The tension is in-built in the
individual, group and class relationships as well. The funo-
tional role of this tension has been system preserving because
1- Ibid., P. 134
2- Ibid., P. 135
3- Ibid.
it acts as an integrating and amalgamating force. 1 A shifting
and fluctuating balance provides the opportunity for the wea-
ker to become the stronger and the stronger, the weaker. Thus,
no one in the position of power can be sure of the permanency
of his status. Every one is engaged in constant maneuvering
to shift the balance in his favor.
A direct consequence of this tension in the political sys-
tem is that those who are involved in the political process
do not trust the possession and exercise of power.2 The "poli-
tics of distrust" in turn, creates a situation of profound in-
security.
Insecurity is one of the psychological characteristics
that can be found almost in all of the discussions of Iranian
society and history. The observation that everyone agrees
upon is that those who are involved in the politics and occupy
the various political positions have to guard themselves cons-
tantly against the possibility that the power of others -indi-
viduals, government, ete.- will undermine their status and well
being. This feeling of insecurity generates a chronic anxiety
in the political elite and leads to their maneuvers. Through
a complex and delicate process, the individual actors attempt
to establish various networks of alliance and counter alliance
to protect themselves ageinst interpersonal manipulations and
betrayals. Thus, Westwood points out that to understand the
1- Ibid., P. 141
2- Andrew F. Westwood "Politics of Distrust in Iran" The
Annals, (March 1965) P. 124
24
extent of mistrust and insecurity in Iranian political system,
one must look within Iran and to the "negative equilibr'ium of
Iranian politics. "The precarious, ever-shifting balance of
individuals and tiny factions that has denied men the power to
act effectively as government also has denied them the power
to act effectively as opposition."' This has led to a situa-
tion in which Iranians have found it exceptionally difficult
to trust one another or to work together over time. The mis-
trust is not a consequence of ignorance, misunderstanding or
some special national psychological trait. It is rooted in
the reality of politics in Iran. Thus:
"Expecting betrayal, men seek to balance poli-
tical alliance with contradictory alliance, thus
each fulfilling the other's prophecy of bet-
rayal. To have lines of alliance in so many
directions that no betrayal, no development will
leave one isolated and exposed is the ideal, and
the quest after this ideal, of course, leaves
all isolated and exposed. Iranians expect that
the power of government will come to bear against
them unless they can intercede with those who
apply it. Reality confirms this expectation for
more often than not." 2
Marvin Zonis' study of the political elite of Iran shows
the high degree of insecurity among the elite and its relation
to several other character orientations and attitudes. His
major assumption is that the attitudes and behavior of political
elite in societies "whose political processes are less insti-
tutionalized within the formal structures of government" are
valid guides to political change and understanding of the system.
1- Ibid.
2- Ibid.
3- Marvin Zonis The Political Elite of Iran, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971) P. 86
4- Ibid., P. 57
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Zonis' analysis leads him to the conclusion that the members
of the political elite of Iran have four psychological dis-
positions: a) manifest insecurity, b) political cynicism, c)
personal mistrust, and d) interpersonal exploitation. The
more concrete and manifest political attitudes, beliefs, and
opinions of the elite were found to form six clusters: a)
xenophobia, b) orientation to the Shah, c) social disdain,
d) family disdain, e) government disdain, and f) populist
non-elite orientation.
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THE PHENOMENON
I. A Typical Case:
I was born in a middle class family in Tehran, the capital
city of Iran. We are not considered a rich family,but so far
we have lived a very convenient life. My brothers and I were
sert to good primary and high schools and all of us entered
universities first at home and later abroad. My father is a
retired government employee and my mother is a retired school
teacher. Both are educated. From the time that I can remem-
ber (around 1955), each of my parents had his/her own weekly,
bi-weekly, and monthly social gathering with a certain number
of individuals. They called them their friends. I must di-
fferentiate between these special gatherings and "family" ga-
therings. The family socializing occasions were in a complete-
ly different category because firstly, the family gatherings
were not supposed to be on a regular basis. They were random,
or mainly dependent on social occasions, such as the occasions
of birth, marriage or death of a relative or the formal cere-
monial socializings on special holidays and national or reli-
gious observation of particular festivals, etc, while the
meetings of each of my parents, respectively, were scheduled
to be on a continuous, regular basis. My father, on certain
evening during the week, went to meet his hamdowrehiha (the
participants in the same dowreh). And each month the same
familiar group came to our home at a certain afternoon to spend
the evening together. The same pattern was followed by my
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mother who had her own circle of friends that met regularly at
least once a week. Secondly, as a rule, the family gatherings
were "open" to all members of our family and relatives, inclu-
ding the children. The dowreh gatherings of each of my parents,
on the contrary, were closed and limited only to each of them
and their respective dowreh members. As an strictly observed
rule, the children were not allowed to attend their meetings,
nor could the husband or wife participate in the other's weekly
sessions. My father did not attend my mother's dowreh even
when it was held at our home, and my mother refrained from par-
ticipating in her husband's meetings. Very early in life I
learned the meaning of dowreh, its specific rules, and the di-
fferences it had with other types of family and friends social
gatherings. The special form of dowreh meetings was so much
distinguished from other types of socializings, that when in
the home of one of our relatives certain members of family de-
cided to form a family-dowreh, they limited the participation
in it to some agreed-upon relatives, and "olosed" it to others.
When I went to highschool some of my class mates began to have
their own dowrehs, which in their case depended upon the expli-
cit permission of their parents. Iranian highschool girls are
restricted in many aspects of their social life. The conditions,
however, are more liberal and relaxed in the westernized city
of Tehran and particularly in those schools that have a rela-
tively expensive tuition and therefore limited to middle and
upper middle class families. My high school was one of the
all girl schools, with basically middle class girls. Some of
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those who had more financial resources and more liberal parents
could extend their relationships to out of school occasions
and thus form their dowrehs. The daughter of an army officer,
for example, formed a dowreh of five of her friends after her
parents investigated the social background of each would-be-
memoer girl, informed the others' parents, and then provided
their own daughter with the necessities of such extra-high-
school social activity. I could not become a member of one of
these dowrehs because I was not allowed to spend two or three
afternoon each week out of home alone. The same pattern of
making intimate friendships, turning it into a group friend-
ship and forming dowrehs repeated itself among my classmates
in my college years at Tehran University. The difference bet-
ween dowrehs of highschool girls and dowrehs of university stu-
dents was basically in the substance of the conversations. The
university students were more interested in politics, arts and
literature, and their talks very soon turned into hot discu-
ssions about important issues of the day. When I met my future
husband, at the time a young poet and writer, he was an active
member of three different dowrehs, among them a closed circle
of young and old intellectuals, poets, writers, translators
and social critics. After our marriage, I was able to attend,
as a guest and observer, some of the meetings of one of these
three dowrehs. While I was very much interested in attending
the other two doWrevs and I was eager to be accepted as a per-
manent member of all three and my husband was willing to take
me, and while I was an educated woman, it was not possible for
29
me to participate in those dowrehs. The main reasons were:
a) all three dowrehs consisted only of male members, and b)
all members, except my husband, were against the admission
of an outsider to their inner circles, male or female. How-
ever, before coming to the U.S., three years ago, I had the
opportunity to participate in my mother's dowrehs. These were
two weekly gatherings, one always took place in my parents'
home on Thursday evenings (the night symbolically and tra-
ditionally important for the religious Moslems since it pre-
cedes Friday, the Moslem Sabbath day), and the other was a
regular weekly gatherings of some ten women of my mother sta-
tus and age, rotating the meeting place in each individual's
home.
II. General Description:
Despite the enormous changes in the basic institutions
and social structures of Iranian society and the introduction
of modern technology and means of mass communications, many
traditional structures, especially those related to the so-
cial behavior and social communication of individuals are
still functioning in Iran. These traditional institutions and
structures not only have survived the process of change, but
they have assumed a revived role in contemporary Iranian so-
ciety because the effective institutions of social and poli-
tical association and communication are absent. A "dowreh"
is an informal group of individuals who enter into an intimate,
closed-to-others relationship. This group activity is consi-
dered to be on a permanent basis, even if the group disintegrates
30
after a short period of time. The members of group meet perio-
dically, usually rotating the meeting place among the member-
ship. As a common norm a dowreh meets weekly but some may meet
only twice a month, others less often. The group which consti-
tutes a dowreh is a small group, because the usual number of
people in any single dowreh does not exceed twenty and it is
more often about 8 to 15. The more concrete, recognizable
feature of a dowreh is its communicative aspect since the par-
ticipants use it to discuss, organize and communicate with each
other. Clearly, the functions of dowreh as a small group ac-
tivity are not limited to these. Later, during the course of
this investigation, we shall observe that each type of dowreh
fulfills different personal and social functions for its mem-
bership.
The socio-political significance of dowreh lies in the
fact that it is not an isolated phenomenon. The indefinite
number of cells of small group informal association are in-
terrelated and interconnected to each other. Rarely an in-
dividual confines himself to the membership in one dowreh. The
majority, particularly those who are socially or politically
active, will go to more than two dowrehs each week. In each
single dowreh they assume a different social role and enter
into a different type of small group association. What they
carry invariably, however, is their information; the social,
economic, and political information that is transmitted to
them through their communication with their group. Thus, each
individual becomes the linkage between several small group
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eells, and a social network of dowrehs is created. This social
network covers most of the social strata and cuts across diffe-
rent classes. Our research, however, concludes that dowreh is
essentially an urban phenomenon and it can not be said that
such network pervades rural areas of the country too.
III. Characteristic Features:
More specifically, the common characteristic features of
the social phenomenon of dowreh can be summarized as follows:
1) The group activity, association and pattern of inter-
personal relationships is called dowreh when: a) the meeting
among the group is on a regular basis, and a presumed perma-
nent duration; b) the membership of the goup is limited to a
certain number; c) the permanency and regularity of the in-
terpersonal relationships and meeting among the group are
recognized and devotedly observed by the members.
2) The dowreh is a group activity. It is a small, more
precisely, primary group activity. The group is informal and
its relationship is non-associational, if one accepts the
Almond's classification of interest groups into associational,
institutional, non-associational and anomie. Dowreh, there-
fore, is not a formally and legally recognized or registered
association. It is a group like kinship and neighborhood
groups. The individuals who form a dowreh relate and commu-
nicate with eaeh other to attain certain socially identifiable
goal, or satisfy some psychologically recognizable needs. These
1- Gabriel A. Almond & Bringham G. Powell, Comparative Politics:
A Develoental Approach , (Boston: Little Brown, 1966) P. 75
goals and needs are common to all members.
3) The nature of the relationship in a dowreh is inter-
personal. It can be hypothesized that the group activity of
dowreh is an extension of the individual's social life, and
it is closely related to his/her social status as a member of
society, and his/her psychological characteristics as a mem-
ber of certain groups.
4) The act of association through a dowreh and the accep-
tance of membership is voluntary. It is only the individual's
conscious choice that makes him a member of a dowreh , and
not the force of the legal or political institutions. Fur-
thermore, there is no social obligation to make membership in
a dowreh inevitable for individuals.
5) The voluntary act of membership in a dowreh is recog-
nized as legitimate both publicly and privately by the society
as a whole and by non-members individually. The legitimacy of
membership in dowrehs is so much recognized that even the clo-
sest relatives do not interfere with such association.
6) Dowreh is a closed group, in the sense that it is a
social unit composed of certain number of individuals which
does not permit the free participation of others unconditiona-
lly. Of course, it is possible for a member to invite an out-
sider to attend one or two meetings, but the permanent member-
ship in the group and regular participation depends on the
agreement of all members.
7) Viewing dowreh from a different angle, it can be said that
dowreh is a sociological substructure in the overall social
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system. It is a social unit composed of individuals. This
substructure is not political or psychological by itself. It
assumes different functional roles according to the purposes
and social goals for which the group is formed. Thus, dowreh
phenomenon has two distinguished feature: on the one hand, the
internal structure of dowreh, or its behavioral pattern re-
mains unchanged whatever function it assumes. On the other
hand, the substance of this structure, or the functions of
dowreh change continuously. For instance, the internal struc-
ture of a dowreh composed of housewives who discuss their
routine concerns is sociologically identical with the inter-
nal structure of a dowreh composed of intellectuals with poli-
tical concerns.
8) While a specific dowreh is internally closed to other
members of society and therefore as a social unit it has recog-
nizable "boundaries", it is not an isolated, rigid unit. Like
family units that are related to each other and compose the
web of a society, each dowreh is related to others through one
or more of its members. This characteristic is sociologically
and politically significant, since it leads us to the hypothe-
sis that there is a dowreh "social network" in Iranian society.1
As M.N. Sirinavas and Andre Beteille point out, "a social
network can be viewed as a set of concrete interpersonal re-
lations linking the individual to other individuals who are
members of diverse systems of enduring groups and categories.
1- William G. Miller identifies this as "dowreh system".
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Here we represent the network from the viewpoint of the actor,
and there are as many networks as there are actors in a social
system."2 We shall discuss this point later. For the moment,
it is necessary to recognize that different units of dowreh
are connected to each other through their individual members.
In the same way that the individual cuts through the boundaries
of household, lineage, village, and class so as to form inter-
personal relations in the pursuit of his interests, he cuts
across the boundary of his dowreh and becomes a member of se-
veral dowrehs with different social substances. This creates
a web, a social network composed of group cells, in regular
and durable interrelation and communication with each other.
The concept of social network, of course, implies that the di-
fferent units are not interrelated hierarchically, or the po-
ints of linkages are limited. The concept has a further sig-
nificance and that is its emphasis on the communicationsl as-
pect of dowreh network. We shall argue that what makes dowreh
network politically distinctive among other networks of per-
sonal relationships in Iran is this communicational aspect.
1- M. N. Sirivanas and Andre Beteille, "Networks in Indian Social
Structure," MAN Vol. 64, (Nov-Dec, 1964) P. 166
4THE TYPES OF DOWREHS
I. In his discussion about social circles, Charles Kadushin
asserts that social circle is the major informal mechanism which
links power persons and powerful organizations, 1 and concludes
that a social circle has three defining characteristics:
1) A circle may have a chain or network of indirect inter-
action such that most members of a circle are linked to other
members, at least through a third party. It is thus not a
pure face-to-face group.
2) The network exists because members of the circle share
common interests -political or cultural.
3) The circle is not formal -i.e., there are-a) no clear
leaders, although there may be control figures; b) no clearly
defined goals for the circle, though it almost always has some
implicit functions; c) no definite rules which determine modes
of interaction, though there are often customary relationships;
and d) no distinct criteria of membership.2
Kadushin, then, differentiates social circles on the basis
of common interests that circle members may have into four
kinds of circles: cultural, utilitarian, power and influence,
and integrative. Cultural circles "draw members together on
the basis of valuational goals such as religion, psychothera-
py and other 'philosophies of life'; expressive goals such as
literature, art and recreation; and cognitive goals such as
1- Charles Kadushin "Power, Influence and Social Circles: A
New Methodology For Studying Opinion Makers," American
Sociological Review, Vol. 33, No. 5, (Oct, 1968) P. 691
2- Ibid., P. 692
science and technology. "Utilitarian circles are characterized
by the need to trade goods and services with other producers
in 'external economy' industries such as 'Wall Street', or
'Seventh Avenue' or 'Hollywood'." Power and influence circles
are examplified by those involved in the organization and ma-
nagement of power. Finally, integrative circles are "elabo-
rations of interaction resulting from some common experience
such as ethnic membership, wartime experiences, or membership
in an occupational community."I
To classify different dowrehs on the basis of the shared
interests of members is not an easy task. Clearly, there are
structural and functional differences between dowreh as a group
activity and as a social network and social circles as defined
and characterized by Kadushin. A fundamental difference appears
when one considers the social contents or the societies in which
the two phenomena. exist. Social circles discussed by Kadushin
are substructures in highly organized, functionally specific,
industrialized societies of the West. Dowreh is a substructure
in the traditional, functionally diffuse, developing society
of Iran. Consequently, although a dowreh can be considered a
social circle, its functions and varieties go far beyond those
defined by Kadushin.
For analytical purposes, however, we use the four classes
proposed by Kadushin and describe some specific examples of
these four types. After examining specifically political
dowrehs, a description will be given of housewife, friendship,
1- Ibid.
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recreational, intellectual and religious dowrehs that can be
considered among the cultural type. Certain businessmen and
technocrat dowrehs may be regarded as utilitarian. There are
not specifically integrative dowrehs among those presented
here since some of the religious dowrehs fit into that cate-
gory also.
In this section we present the substance of each type of
dowreh. Further explanation will be proposed later.
II. Political Dowrehs:
1. As it w's discussed, the operation of the political
system in Iran is mainly through informal structures. Cliques,
factions, coteries and other informal group formations provide
the main channels of access to power positions. Thus personal
relations are of crucial importance for social mobility. Al-
though the Iranian society is highly stratified, it is possible
for an individual to move up the ladder of social classes
through the network of personal relationships. The formation
and increase in the number of factions, cliques and other types
of personal alliances has been encouraged by the authoritarian
nature of political system, and the insecurity and conflict
which it creates. As we observed, a characteristic feature of
Iran's political system since 1925 until 1941, and from 1953
until recent crisis is that the formation of all kinds of po-
litical associations, parties and interest groups as legitimate
channelg for political activity has been controlled., hampered
and banned by the government. Thus, the dowreh system has
assumed major functions in the Iranian political system. Not
only does it provide effective channels for mobility, but it
is used as a substitute for some political organizations such
as parties. Individuals make their alliances by participating
in different dowrehs, and more important, they use various
dowrehs as their primary source of political information and
communication.
There are numerous cases in which a specific dowreh com-
posed of upper class members has led to a socially signifi-
cant political organization, such as a party, or action, such
as a political movement. It is believed that the constitutional
movement in Iran originated in dowreh-like gatherings and
secret societies. Miller asserts that most of Iran's politi-
cal parties before 1953 were expansions of small dowrehs. 1 And
it is a known fact that all major parties after 1953 have been
the extension of different dowrehs.
Among those dowrehs which have led to political parties
two cases are well-known: The Arani Circle and the Progressive
Center.
a) Dr. Arani's Circle:
In 1941, shortly after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran
a circle of young Marxist intellectuals in Tehran formed the
nucleus of Iran's most important communist party, the Tudeh
(Masses) party. Within two years this circle grew into a
national movement with considerable following among the inte-
llectuals and the working class. It remained a major political
force until its supression in 1953.2
1- Miller, Op, Cit.
2- Abrahamian, Op, Cit., P. 291
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The majority of those intellectuals who created the ori-
ginal nucleus of communist movement in 1941 were the former
members of Dr. Arani's circle, who were just freed from pri-
son.'
Dr. Taqi Arani was born into an Azeri-speaking middle class
family in Tabriz at the turn of the century. He completed one
of the few secular schools in the city and left for Tehran. At
the height of the anti-British demonstrations after the First
World War he entered medical school in Tehran, and very soon
he was drawn into the nationalist movement. Arani was strong-
ly influenced by extreme nationalism. "While advocating rapid
modernization, he favored the elimination of foreign words from
Persian, the revival of Zoroastrian ideals, and the creation
of a centralized state, claiming that the Sassanian Empire had
such an administration." 2
After graduating from college in 1922, Arani went to stu-
dy Chemistry in Berlin. While living in Weimar Republic, he
was exposed to socialist ideas. He studied socialist litera-
ture, took an active interest in the German left wing, and
through it in the exiled communist party of Iran. During his
study for his doctorate, he taught Arabic at the university,
wrote three short book about Persian literature and attracted
around him a circle of fellow Iranian students interested in
Socialism. "The European left wing, however, failed to alter
1- Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1966) P. 64
2- Abrahamian, Op Cit., P. 294
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his nationalistic views of the linguistic issue in Iran."l
Arani returned home in 1930, a convinced Marxist deter-
mined to introduce and popularize Marxism in Iran. This was
made impossible by a 1931 law banning the propagation of Socia-
lism and Communism in Iran. Thus, he and some of his collea-
gues from Germany formed a dowreh-like secret circle and or-
ganized discussion groups. During the meetings, they read
and translated socialist classics and prepared articles on the
class struggle, historical materialism and the social sciences
for their underground journal, Dunya (the world).
In April 1937, after a student strike at the Tehran Tech-
nical College, the police uncovered the organization and arres-
ted Arani with fifty-two of his associates. Although some of
them were soon released, the group remained famous as "the
fifty-three." After sixteen months of intensive investiga-
tions, forty-eight of them were brought to trial. Among them
"twenty-six had attended higher institutions for learning,
six of them West European universities. Professionally, the
group comprised two professors, four physicians, three lawyers,
one engineer, three high school principals, four high school
teachers, eleven civil servants, eight workers, and one pea-
sants. The average age of the intellectuals among them was
only thirty seven."2
It is known that Arani's followers met in different dis-
cussion groups. Thus, it can be said that they could extend
their original dowreh into other dowrehs. "More than 65 per-
1- Ibid.
2- Ibid.
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cent of the circle belonged to the middle class, 15 percent to
the upper middle class, and 20 percent to the lower bourgeoi-
sie."1
After their arrest, in early January 1938, formal indict-
ments were issued by the prosecutor general of Tehran, and a
public trial was held from November 2 to November 13 of that
year. All were prosecuted under the Anti-Communist Act of
1931, and were charged with having communist ideas. However,
all of the fifty-three denied being communists. Some of the
defendants admitted an interest in Marxism, and many confessed
to be socialist.
The trial ended with the conviction of the fifty-three
defendants. Ten of the leaders received the maximum penalty
of ten years imprisonment; the others received terms ranging
from three to seven years. Arani himself died in the prison
hospital on February 1940, allegedly because of the deliberate
negligence of hospital authorities.2
On December 18, 1941, only two days after Reza Shah's
abdication, twenty-seven of "the fifty-three" were released.
Among these, those who had retained their political convic-
tions decided to form a communist party with the title Tudeh
(Masses). "The leading personalities in this decision were
Arani's colleagues from Europe."3 Within a year, the Tudeh
party in Tehran had grown enough to call its first provincial
conference. One hundred and twenty delegates, each representing
1- Zabih, Op, Cit, P. 67
2- Ibid., P. 68
3- Abrahamian, Op, Cit, P. 299
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ten members in the capital and vicinity, drew up a program
for the party and elected fifteen candidates to its provin-
cial central committee. This leadership was given the au-
thority to act as the official central committee of the whole
national organization until the convening of the first party
congress.1
b) The Progressive Center:
Unlike Dr. Arani's circle, the "Progressive Center" was
not formed to transform the political system, or educate people
to an ideology. The constituting members were all from the
upper classes, they believed in the political system and their
purpose was to attain power positions. Thus the party which
their dowreh was its nucleus, became a system supporting party
financed by the government and controlled by the Shah himself.
Shortly after a government sponsored referendum on the
Shah's "white revolution" in 1963, rumors spread throughout
Tehran political circles that with the advise of the United
States State Department and of the C.I.A., a single-party
would be created by the Shah.2 At this time, one of the famous
dowrehs of Tehran was the one organized and participated by
Hassan Ali Mansur, called Kanun-i-Taraghi (Progressive Center).
Apparently, the regular meetings of this dowreh were devoted
to discussions on Iran's social and economic problems. But,
immediately after the spread of the rumors, the dowreh was
further distinguished by being royally charted as the Economic
Research Bureau to the Imperial Court. This symbolized the
1- Ibid.
2- Marvin Zonis, Op, Cit, P. 86
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intentions of the members of the dowreh. Earlier, Mansur had
said that his colleagues would play no role in Iranian poli-
tics and his center would develop a proper foundation and be-
come popular. "Apparently, the 'foundation' that Mansur sought
was not to be found in mass support. For mass support or even
a firm base among the political elite would bear no relation
to the fundamental source of political power in Iranian society
-the Shahanshah."
After the granting of the royal charter, the Progressive
Center, held a rally and Mansur announced that members of the
Center could enter the coming elections of the Majles (Iranian
Parliament).
Late in the summer of 1963, a government sponsored Congress
of "Free Men and Free Women of Iran" was held in Tehran. This
Congress proposed a list of 193 candidates to be elected. The
list has been prepared by negotiations between Mansur and the
Ministry of Interior. Of the 193 candidates, 38 (including
Mansur ) were members of Progressive Center. In the subsequent
elections all were elected.
Within two months, after the Majles held its first session,
150 of deputies joined the Progressive Center. By December
15, Mansur announced the conversion of his Center into a
party called Iran-I-Novin (New Iran). In March 1964, Mansur
was called by the king to form a new government. As he pre-
dicted earlier, party members did hold all cabinet portfolios,
2
save the ministers of war and foreign affairs. Although,
1- Ibid., P. 87
2- Ibid., P. 88
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only months after its founding, the Iran-i-Novin party was in
control of the cabinet and the parliament, the Shah ordered
the formation of other "loyal opposition" small parties.
The members of the Progressive Center dowreh could re-
tain power positions after the assasination of Mansure, be-
cause immediately Hoveyda, an intimate friend and colleaugue
of Mansur and one of the founders of the dowreh was appointed
prime minister in 1964. The group remained in power more than
13 years. When finally Hoveyda was ordered to resign in 1977,
the members of another dowreh occupied the power positions.
These individuals were members of an older dowreh called Guruh-
i-Iran-i Now (New Iran Group). Two active and influential
members of this group, Amuzegar and Ansari became prime minis-
ter and minister of finance respectively. Nearly forty per-
cent of the members of the New Iran Group were employed at one
time by the United States Point IV Program.1
2. It may be argued that rarely there are instances of
purely "political" dowrehs since the acts of making political
alliances and transmitting political information can be done
in other kinds of dowreh gatherings such as friendship or
recreational dowrehs. But, in fact, there are specifically
political dowrehs as we described earlier.
Marvin Zonis, in his study of the political elite of Iran,
presents an "ideal type" of a dowreh in general. But our
further research points to the specifically political nature
of this dowreh, and therefore we present it here as the "ideal-
type" of a political dowreh.
1- Bill Op. Cit, P. 47
2- Zonis Op, Cit, PP. 238-239
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Zonis gives the names, level of education, age, principal
and secondary occupation of the eleven members of one of the
oldest political-economic elite dowrehs of Iran. These indi-
viduals constitute the core of this old, continuously opera-
ting dowreh. Zonis reports that along with four or five others
who have joined or left the group over time, the 11 members
have been meeting weekly for lunch over twenty-five years.
Some of the salient characteristics of these individuals which
testify to their common interests are gathered in a table by
Zonis:
BIRTH DATE, EDUCATION, AND OCCUPATION OF THE
MEMBERS OF AN "IDEAL-TYPE" DOWREH
Members Birth Education Principal Secondary
Date Occupation Occupation
M. Namazi
M. Khosrow
Shahi
G.H. Khushbin 1898
A.H. Behnia 1907
N. Entezam 1889
A. Entezam 1907
M. Najmabadi 1894
1901 Traditional
1920 European
Commercial
D. Law
Geneva
D. Economics
Paris
D. Law
Paris
Tehran School
of Diplomacy
D.Law
Paris
A. Ardalan 1910 D. Law
Paris
E. Mahdavi 1901 Agricultural
College,
Germany
A. Vakili
A. Amini
1908 License,
Paris
1905 D. Law
Paris
Senator
President
Tehran Chamber
of Commerce
Minister of
Justice
Minister of
Finance
Ambassador
to France
Director
National Ira-
nian Oil Co.
Ambassador
to Britain
Ambassador
to Moscow
Minister of
Agriculture
Senator
Business
Business
Banking
Business
Landowner-
ship
Landowner-
ship
Farming
Business
Prime Minister Landowner-
ship
(1)
1- Zonis, Op, Cit., P. 238
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This dowreh has the reputation of being the "french doc-
torate" group, although some of the members have not been edu-
cated in France. The reason for this reputation gives another
clue to the foundations of dowrehs in Iran. Usually those who
are familiar with a certain culture and have attended higher
educational institutions in the country of that culture, form
their clique with marked preference for that culture and lan-
guage. For instance, the above-mentioned New Iran Group is
notorious for its Americanism. In the same way, there are
Anglophile, Germanophile, and other such groups and dowrehs.
As it is clear from the table presented by Zonis, with
few exceptions, the members of this dowreh are all in the same
generation and have had similar educational experiences. The
members of the dowreh held the important political positions
listed in the table within the period of three years in the
early 1960s, particularly while Amini was prime minister. It
is, therefore, logical that Zonis includes the names of all
eleven among the 307 most politically powerful Iranians. The
source of this power is explained by the table itself. Allele-
ven individuals are economically strong.
To explain the prevalence of these kinds of groups, Zonis
emphasizes their occupations. He quotes a member of the elite
as referring to them as *'joint stock companies' for the exploi-
tation of the political situation and less frequently of the
economic situation."1
In zonis' view, such groups are formed "ostensibly on
1- Ibid.
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non-political grounds" because of the impossibility of overt
political activity. The purpose of the group "is the mutual
furtherance of the member's careers. These groups may even
bind their members to secrecy and mutual aid by oaths or va-
rious rituals."' The "french doctorate" dowreh, Zonis main-
tains, is an apt example of this type. Like the examples men-
tioned earlier, the members of this dowreh "placed" its mem-
bers in different positions throughout the political structure.
"With the assistance of these representatives,
the power of almost all significant sections
of that structure can be utilized for purposes
of mutual welfare. If some members of the
group are in while others are out of power,
no one need suffer unduly." 2
This kind of using dowreh for mutual welfare in Zonis'
view, provides Iranian politics with a significant degree of
continuity and stability.
"When one of the members of the clique is ele-
vated to a position of political importance,
there exists a long established coterie of
fellow elites who can be called upon to fill
other offices. The premiership is the most
vital of these." 3
Limiting himself to his own dowreh, a new prime minister
can choose individuals to hold ministerial portfolios, "men
who have known each other, communicated with each other on
a relatively intimate basis, and developed a more or less
common outlook together for a number of years." However,
the practice of placing dowreh members in power positions is
not limited to premiership, since similar opportunities arise
1- Ibid., P. 240
2- Ibid.
3- Ibid.
4- Ibid.
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when one member of the dowreh accedes to any position of ad-
ministrative responsibility.
3. The Iranian political system is characterized by
"tension, conflict and rivalry." The Iranian political elite
is distinguished by "manifest insecurity." Both of these
features are related to the personal and group relations in
dowreh system. As James Bill points out, the dynamics of in-
dividual and group relationships interwine in the dowreh.1
Conflict and rivalry pervades the Iranian political sys-
tem. Thus, tension exists virtually in all power positions
in the system. Conflict involves personalities at every le-
vel. What intensifies this conflict is the artificially crea-
ted overlapping and doubling of positions by the Shah who is
located at the center of the web of conflict.
"The entire conflict stems from the struggle of
the individuals concerned to gain greater favor
with the Shah and at the same time to capture
more control in the Iranian economic arena." 2
Consequently, all power positions are occupied by indi-
viduals "who are profoundly insecure."
"They have all come to realize that royalty, com-
petence, and service do not necessarily insure
them of their position, but that becoming too
popular or too unpopular or too powerful or too
weak are also vital variables......... Former
friends and close associates upon gaining im-
portant influence in the political elite abj"upt-
ly become fierce rivals.....Even the incredibly
powerful work overtime not only to build their
own networks of influence domestically but also
to build international ties and supports." 3
The dowreh network provides the structural means of
1- Bill, The Politics of Iran, Op Cit, P. 44
2- Ibid., PP. 40-41
3- Ibid., P. 44
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mobility and survival of the elite in the political system.
Formal organizations, commitees, commissions and associations
can not operate as such in this system. Fissures, arguements,
inactivity, personalism and organizational chaos are what cha-
racterize these formal organizations.
"The more subtle, intricate, and complex facets
of tension and rivalry do not thrive in a for-
mal setting where votes are counted and minutes
recorded. In such organizations, one must take
stands, submit to chairmen, presidents, and
moderators, cooperate with others one does not
really trust, open oneself to much unnecessary
criticism, and bind oneself to time schedules,
rules and procedures." 1
The dowreh network can be considered as the vehicle through
which the rivalries and conflicts pass. During the meetings
of a dowreh the important bargaining, negotiating, and decision
making takes place.
Furthermore, as Bill observes, the dowreh metwork keeps
many rivalries hidden which lessens dangerous encountets and
imbalances. Mechanisms such as dowreh "encourage plotting
and omnipresent interlaced antagonism but discourage concen-
trated and shattering confrontations," 2 In the same way, it
weakens and splinters opposition while at the same time covers
and hides it. Since most members of classes have their own
dowrehs, and these dowrehs are related through linkage points
of dowreh network, it may be said that dowreh structure "serves
to knit together a class structure that would otherwise be very
brittle." 3
1- Ibid., P. 45
2- Ibid., P. 48
3- Ibid., P. 49
Zonis, with his emphasis upon the "manifest insecurity"
as one of the characteristics of the political elite of Iran,
points out that organizing and participation in a dowreh large-
ly stems from the feeling of insecurity among the elite. He
quotes elude and Florence Kluckhohn as saying: "because of the
tension of continual struggle for social place, people have
tried to gain a degree of routinized and recognized fixity by
allying themselves with others in voluntary associations." 1
Dowreh is a voluntary association, and members of the political
elite turn to it "to obtain a sense of security in the face of
changing social system and more importantly as a base to attain
or maintain political power." 2 Membership in a dowreh, as well
as multiple job holding,
"are used to provide fallback positions, to offer
the elite a variety of access points through
which to approach the formal structures of poli-
tical power, to multiply the elite's communica-
tion patterns, to provide contact with a diver-
sity of individuals within and without the elite,
and to establish reciprocal obligations with as
many individuals representing as diverse sectors
of Iranian life as possible. All such motives,
in short, center around the acquisition of a
sense of security." 3
4. As we observed earlier dowreh is a social network that
cuts across most of the classes and social strata of the so-
ciety. A major role of the dowrehs in the political system
is the communication function that they provide. As Miller
points out, in the absence of an independent press, radio or
television, dowreh network is one of the most persuasive and
rapid means of transmission of political information, ideas
1- Zonis, OpCit, P. 238
2- Ibid.
3- Ibid., P. 241
or policies. For instance, the political information is ra-
pidly transmitted to the Bazaar merchants through different
dowrehs. They, in turn, convey the information to Bazaar
associates and customers. Thus, at this point, information
becomes the Bazaar "rumor", "which for all its shortcomings
is still the most effective means of communication between
the elite and the populace as a whole." 2 Through the same
means, information about the masses flows up to the elite
dowrehs. It is, therefore, possible for the elite to trans-
mit political opinions or gossip from the "high societies"
of the north of Tehran, to the mosques, workshops, and tea-
houses in the remotest corners of the south Tehran Bazaar
within hours and to other cities of Iran, or even the coun-
tries outside of Iran within a day or two. 3
Zonis, in his empirical research gives evidence for the
statement that dowreh network is the source of information for
the Iranian political elite. Among the three sources from
which they most frequently get news about Iranian political
and economic affairs, the most frequently cited single source
is "other persons," i.e., dowreh members.
5. The relationship between the formal political system
and the dowreh network is extremely important. As Bill observes,
in times when the pressures of the political system increases,
the dowreh network would flourish and would continue to grow
and multiply. And at times, the leaders of the formal system
1- Miller, Op, Cit, P. 164
2- Ibid.
3- Ibid.
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would break up the dowreh network which they would not tole-
rate. 1 Furthermore, the leaders of the formal political sys-
tem have tried to destroy the dowreh network by infiltration.
Reza Shah did not like secretive dowrehs. And the present
Shah has tried successfully to control, destroy or change the
substance of different dowrehs through the medium of his crow-
ded secret police organization. Bill gives an example. "In
1961 eight middle-class Iranian friends and scholars met and
formed a dowreh to discuss socio-political issues. They ag-
reed on certain areas of concern and mimeographed a confiden-
tial one-page statement presenting their mutual opposition to
corruption, injustice and oppression. Each member took a copy
and the rest were locked away. Five months later, the Chief
of the Secret Police called in one of the men and confronted
him with a copy of the statement. It was one of the original
eight copies. The dowreh broke up immediately." 2
But we are not to think that all elite's dowrehs are po-
litical. For instance, a deputy minister told me of his non-
political dowreh which could be stopped because of political
considerations. He told me that they were eight members, all
in politically sensitive positions. One, for example, was the
head of a department in the Security Organization (SAVAK). They
met weekly, and their meetings were strictly non-political in
the sense that by agreement they did not discuss any politically
significant issue. During their meetings they discussed per-
sonal problems and asked each other personal favors; to promote
1- Bill, Op, Cit.,P. 47
2- Ibid.
a friend or a relative, to block a move by an unfriendly offi-
cial in Plan Organization, etc. Their personal relationship
was based on old friendship. This dowreh is held continuous-
ly for more than eight years. Two years ago, it so happened
that all the members of the group were outside Tehran, in ano-
ther city. They could not, therefore, meet according to the
scheduled time. The seven members decided to send a telegram
to their friend in Tehran. They did send the telegram with
their initials under it which formed two Persian words meaning
"the king's army". "The king's army" was also the name of the
dowreh. However, their friend in Tehran did not receive the
telegram. Instead he was interrogated about the meaning of
the telegram and the presumed conspiratory group!
III. Cultural and Interative Dowrehs:
As we me'ntioned earlier, Kadushin defines cultural social
circles as those which draw members together on the basis of
valuational, expressive, and cognitive goals. Integrative
circles, in his view, are those based on the interaction re-
sulting from some common experience such as ethnic membership,
or membership in an occupational community. While we accept
this classification for analytical purposes, we assume that
some of the cultural dowrehs may be considered as integrative
and vic-versa. Because of this we combine these two catego-
ries. Thus, a religious dowreh can be viewed both as cultural
and integrative.
As examples of cultural and integrative dowrehs we shall
describe and analize these types: housewives, friendship,
recreational, intellectual and religious dowrehs.
1. Housewives Dowrehs:
The term "housewife", of course, is vague and may be in-
terpreted in various ways. It is used here to identify and
differentiate a specific form of small group activity of Ira-
nian women. They are regarded as housewives because: a) they
do not engage in any official public activity and are not mem-
bers of any formal association, b) they are not employed by
any private or public organization and c) their essential so-
cial role is performed as housewives. Included under this ca-
tegory are retired women and those who in spite of having the
possibility of being career women, have chosen to stay home.
Housewives' dowrehs are socially important in a society
like Iran. The Majority of Iranian women are still illitrate,
traditional and living in rural areas. Their social activity
is limited to child rearing and working on the farms. The li-
ving conditions of urbanized, middle class women is compara-
tively better. Most of the middle class women are educated,
at least to the lower levels of primary and high schools. It
is among these urbanized, middle class women that dowreh as a
social activity is prevalent. The prevalence of dowreh among
them can be explained mainly by the conditions under which they
live. Unlike upper class women, a middle class woman cannot
find a job outside her home because either she is unskilled or
her traditionalist husband does not accept her role as a career
woman. Furthermore, the social norms of the society do not
allow women to participate in any kind of social activity (such
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as membership in clubs or community organizations), or to spend
their leisure time by themselves ( such as going to a movie,
or dining alone in a restaurant).
In recent years, however, there have been significant
changes in the social conditions of Iranian women. They now
represent almost one-third of the country's work force and 37
percent of students in colleges and universities. Women can
vote, and be appointed to public offices. But, despite these
changes, the overall conditions of women in Iran remain un-
changed. In many areas still the norms like pre-arranged ma-
rriage or the laws such as inheritance laws exist. For instance,
an Iranian married woman cannot travel without the written con-
sent of her husband. Or a daughter inherits only half of what
a son does from the family estate; a wife inherits only one-
eighth of her husband's estate and none of his fixed assets,
such as land, etc.
Consequently, a middle class woman cannot extend the range
of her social relations beyond family and friend relationships.
Most of the time, she is confined to her home. This is true
even in the case of educated and socially active women, parti-
cularly at the time of their retirement.
Like neighborhood and family group activities, housewives'
dowrehs provide excellent opportunities for self-expression,
social interaction, and psychological gratification for middle
class women. A "typical" Iranian middle class, urbanized house-
wife usually participates in two or three dowrehs. One may be
a family dowreh composed of female relatives. The other may
be a neighborhood dowreh composed of female neighbors. Finally,
the third one is usually a dowreh comprised of old friends, or
the wives of husband's colleaugues.
Examples: Mrs. Karimi is a retired teacher. At the moment
of interview she has two dowrehs. While she was young and ac-
tive she participated in at least four dowrehs a week. One of
her present dowrehs is a reminiSCert of those day. This dowreh
has continued to meet regularly over the past twenty years. The
core members are six individuals who met each other while wor-
king in the same school. During the past years, some members
were added to the group and then withdrawn. All six members
are educated. The range of their family income is more or less
equal. All are married, and know each other's husbands. Their
dowreh, however, is not open to their husbands' participation.
As in the past, their weekly gathering is spent talking,
drinking tea and eating snacks or food. Their discussions are
centered-around personal problems, their activity during the
previous week, their relationship with their husbands and
children, etc. They also discuss rumors and gossips.
The second dowreh is completely different from the first
one. It is a monthly gathering. The meeting place does not
rotate among the membership, it is always at the home of Mrs.
Karimi. The-core membership of this dowreh is composed of 16
women. Six of these are relatives, five are neighbors and the
other five are friends. But participation in this dowreh is
not limited. The meetings are open to the female friends and
relatives of the participants. The reason for the openness of
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this dowreh is its special character. It is mainly a religious
dowreh. Or, more exactly, it is a dowreh whose meetings are
divided into two phases. The first phase is strictly reli-
gious and the rituals of the meetings are in accordance with
the common religious meetings called Rawze. A Rawze is a ser-
mon session during which one or few Moslem preachers each talk
about an hour for the audience. The sermon of each preacher
ends with a rite of mourning for a few minutes. Mrs. Karimi
holds this Rawze every month because it gives her moral and
psychological satisfaction and is in accordance with her reli-
gious obligations.
The first phase of each meeting of the dowreh starts with
the arrival of the preacher. All participants sit around the
room on the floor covered with a carpet. The preacher, an
old Mullah enters the house, goes directly into the room, sits
on the only chair prepared for him. He is the only male pre-
sent. All others are female and they have wrapped themselves
in the traditional Iranian veil, Chador. The mullah talks for
an hour about social problems, the religious issues, and the
life and behavior of Shi'ite saints. When he reaches to the
last few minutes of his sermon, he begins to raise his voice
and sings the eulogies about the prophet's family and Shi'ite
Imams. While he sadly reminds the audience of the sufferings
of the Shi'ite Saints, women begin to mourn and show their
sympathy with crying and beating themselves. They cry, weep,
scream and beat themselves for about five to ten minutes. Then
the preacher lowers his voice and starts praying. The audience
stops mourning and joins the prayer. After a few minutes of
praying the ritual ends. The preacher leaves the house imme-
diately. His departure signals the beginning of the second
phase. Usually the outsiders leave too. Those who remain,
including the 16 core members, put their Chadors away, and
start talking, drinking tea, and eating fruits, etc. The mood
always turns into a joyous and happy one. Some start telling
jokes and every one laughs. Then, the most able starts singing
popular songs and someone begins dancing, while others colla-
borate by clapping!
I asked Mrs. Karimi whether she sees any contradiction
in the different phases of this dowreh. Her answer was nega-
tive. She said that religiously the joyous session was legi-
timate. It was the logical phase after a mourning session.
In her view most of the participants came to the first part
because they wanted to "pour out" some of their emotional prob-
lems through mourning and screaming. The second phase was a
necessary consequence of the first, because all women were
then, at least for the moment, calm and emotionally happy. Her
explanation, in technical language can be restated as : the
first phase of the group meeting provides a situation for co-
llective psychological "catharsis". The second phase, provides
for the restablishment of a normal recreational situation and
the demonstration of psychological gratification.
2. Friendship Dowrehs:
Perhaps the most common type of dowreh is a friendshIP
dowreh. It may be said that the pattern of a friendship dowreh
is inbuilt almost into all other types of dowreh, since a
dowreh begins with the establishment of strong personal ties
between individuals. But what differentiates a friendship
dowreh from other types is its substance. While other dow-
rehs evolve to assume different functions, the functions of
a friendship dowreh does not change over time. The basic
interest shared by all members is the personal ties of friend-
ship. The group meets regularly to enhance these ties. The
members are satisfied by the psychological gratification they
attain through interpersonal communication and group identifi-
cation. There is not, in a "typical" friendship dowreh, any
purposes beyond personal communication. This is perhaps one
of the reasons of the permanence of such dowrehs. A friendship
dowreh usually begins in highschool or college and survives
throughout the lives of members. The majority of middle and
upper class members have their friendship dowrehs in one form
or another.
Examples:
A wealthy, educated young woman who has spent the last 12
years working as an executive secretary for various cabinet
ministers, and is married to a famous gynocologist, told me
that she has regularly participated in her friendship dowreh
for the past 15 years. The 10 members are all ladies of upper
class origin. They all met and established intimate relations
with each other during their highschool education at a famous
French school in Tehran. She said that their dowreh meets
weekly. Although members are married to politically influen-
tial men, the dowreh is basically non-political. They meet only
to know about each other, to talk about their private prob-
lems, and to consult one another. All the members are, of
course, female and in the same age group. Over the past
15 years, they observed one rule strictly; not to expand mem-
bership or allow any outsider to participate in the dowreh,
not even their husbands.
This woman's husband has his own weekly dowreh, which is
recreational, i.e., it is a gambling dowreh.
Another kind of friendship dowreh was the one participa-
ted by an intellectual. He said that over the past ten years
he meets regularly with a certain number of his friends once
a week. They are 12 individuals; 4 of them are university pro-
fessors, 2 are publishers, one is a lawyer, 3 are state emplo-
yees and 2 are businessmen. In fact, he said they do not have
much in common. What binds them together is personal ties de-
veloped during their highschool and college period. They meet
because they want to see each other, to discuss their personal
problems and help one another.
3. Recreational Dowrehs:
Recreational dowrehs are those social gatherings which are
basically for the satisfaction of a physical or psychological
need, hobby or habit. There are many variations of this kind
of dowreh in Iran; the most notorious are gambling dowrehs and
sexual (orgy-type) dowrehs.
Gambling, drinking alcoholic beverages and extra-marital
sexual relationships are all prohibited by Islamic laws. The
upper classes however, meet regularly to fulfill these desires.
a). Gambling dowrehs are the most prevalent type of rec-
reational dowrehs. Not only there are special houses and clubs
for this purpose, but eaqch group, especially among the elite,
has its own dowreh, including the Shah himself. The number of
members in such a dowreh depends on the type of gambling. Usu-
ally, poker games are the most common. The gynocologist men-
tioned above, every week meets five other doctors, and the
meeting place rotates. They gather only for the purpose of
gambling. The amount of money that circulates at each session
is sometimes astonishing, often more than $1G,000. The mem-
bership in these dowrehs is strictly limited, since a certain
level of mutual trust is an abolute necessity. If someone
looses a: large sum of money, this must remain confidential since
there are numerous cases that when the case becomes known, some
unwanted troubles follow. For instance, the middle and lower
classes begin rumors about the amount of the wealth of the loo-
ser, which is not socially favorable in Iran, because even
very rich people tend to hide their wealth.
Gambling also occupies a major part of family dowrehs.
Some families gather every week and men and women start gam-
bling for a whole day or night while children play.
b) Drinking and Opium Smoking is another type of recrea-
tional dowreh. Since drinking is prohibited by Islam, the way
that most Iranians drink is different from Western people. By
social norms, drinking in itself is a socially unacceptable
act. Not only it is limited to adults, but by norms, it is
regarded essentially as a masculine habit. Women are absolutely
63
prohibited by social norms to drink, even though many middle
and upper class women do drink in fact, but usually in a
European fashion, i.e., having a light drink like a beer or
wine during or after dinner. Men, however, generally drink
in groups and in large amounts. In a typical drinking session,
men sit together. Before having lunch or dinner, they start
drinking vodka or beer (not wine) and talk. They continue
drinking during and after the meal until the day or night is
over and they are drunk. Then everyone leaves. We must point
out that the capacity to drink unlimited amounts of alcoholic
beverages without getting drunk is a sign of prestige and du-
ring the session everyone pretends not to be drunk, sometimes
to the point of being sick. The substance of talks, of course,
is routine business, gossip and rumors, jokes and politics.
Opium smoking dowrehs are performed in the same pattern.
Opium was introduced to the Iranian upper classes in the 19th
century, but it rapidly grew into a national habit. Although
the government has banned its use in all forms, it is estima-
ted that there are half a million opium addicts in Iran, most-
ly of the old generation.
Whether opium smoking is a personal individual addiction
or not, the act of smoking is usually a social habit, and the
addiction of young people begins in the dowreh-like smoking
social gatherings.
The way that Persians smoke opium also shows its social
nature. There must be large amounts of burning charcoal and
one or two pipes. The host puts the burning charcoal in a
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specially designed flat piece of metal, in the middle of the
room. The guests sit in a circle around it. The hostess, usu-
ally the lady of the house, brings tea and nuts and pastries
and other snacks. Then, the most respected, usually the old-
est, starts smoking by a special pipe and then, the pipe goes
around. After two or three rounds, everyone is in a state of
relaxation and happiness, Then they start talking; discussing
political, social issues, or personal problems. It is impor-
tant to have in mind that the way the Persians smoke opium does
not cause hallucination for the smoker. The state of mind,
in the words of one smoker, is "relaxed and clear, ready to
concentrate but unable because of the euphoria-like feeling of
the soul." This, apparently is a different feeling from the
feeling one experiences by using other kinds of drugs. Also
one must be aware that the stereo-type of an opium smoker in
Iranian culture is totally different from, say, the stereo-
type of a heroin addict in the U.S. Iranians do not look at
an opium smoker as a criminal.
Since in recent times the use of opium is prohibited by
law, the smoking dowrehs are more common, especially among
the intellectuals and youngsters. The addiction to opium,
however, is socially unacceptable.
c. The sexual dowreh is not too common, but there are
different varieties of it throughout Iran, especially in Tehran
and cities like Isfahan. Sex, like alcohol and gamblimg is a
taboo in the Iranian culture. Traditionally in cities like
Isfahan, where religious norms are very strong,there has been
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weekly dowrehs that were a combination of all three. It is
still a social habit of the rich Isfahanis (usually Bazaaris)
to have their "drinking-smoking-sex" dowrehs. A member of one
of these dowrehs described it as follows: A homosexual tenden-
cy among Isfahanis is well known. Thus, many rich Isfahani
men have their secret lover boy, since the homosexual tendency
assumes a particular child loving nature in Iran. Men, how-
ever, usually marry early, but they continue to search for the
apportunity to sleep with a prostitute. (Prostitution formally
does not exist in religious cities like Isfahan). The special
dowreh is composed of 20 or more mutually trustful members,
who are either merchants of the Bazaar themselves, or young
sons of the Bazaaris, or favored people in the Bazaari Commu-
nity. They know each other pretty well, i.e., they know their
families, friends, social habits, etc. And they trust each
other totally, in the sense that none of the talks or events
of dowreh becomes socially known to outsiders. The place of
the meeting is in a villa outside the city. Thus, the social
habit assumes the expression of going to the Bagh (garden).
It is important to notice that the meeting does not take place
in the city, or in the home of one of the members. Also, we
must bear in mind that the wives of these men know about the
dowreh and whatever happens there and whether they agree or
not, they do not protest, since it is socially permitted.
The meetings usually starts at 10 in the morning, when
all members have arrived. A group of servants are present
to help every one. Also one or two cooks are at work. The
villa has at least three large rooms. Everyone is male. Some-
times, however there are one or two prearranged prostitutes
present. To an outsider, young and old. men are all well dre-
ssed and well behaved. They all sit around the room. But on-
ly an insider knows that most of the men who sit next to each
other are emotionally and sexually attached. The most res-
pected sit at the best location, usually upper side of the
room. Everyone sits on the floor covered with carpets.
At first, tea and snacks are served by the servants. The
talks begin. Mostly they are about politics and business. Then,
after two or three hours, the lunch is served in another room.
Immediately before and after lunch, the drinking of alcoholic
beverages begins in the same manner that was described earlier.
Interestingly enough, not every one would drink. Some are
very religious and they start their daily prayer in another
room. However, opium and hashish are not strictly prohibited
by Islam. Thus, after lunch the smoking procession starts.
Large sums of hashish first, and then opium must be consumed
by everyone present. We said must, because any act of rejec-
tion will be interpreted as a sign of rejection of participa-
tion in the whole group activity and breach in mutual trust
and confidence. After one or two hours of smoking and drinking,
if prostitutes are available, the willing persons go to another
room for sexual act. Notice that the act is done in private
and not in front of the others. Sometimes, there is a boy
prostitute. Those, who have come with their lovers, start
love making in another room.
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With the arrival of the night, the participants depart
one by one. The next morning, when the same people confront
each other in the Bazaar, they behave in the normal business
fashion. For instance, a young boy whose private role in the
previous day's dowreh was to be the lover of a famous Bazaari
merchant, rnow in the Bazaar acts as a service boy for the same
person on strictly contractual, publicly recognizable basis.
In recent years some members of upper classes, especialy
young Western educated ones, have their own version of this
"drinking-smoking-sex" dowreh, with two distinctive differen-
ces; the members are not all male, and membership is mixed. At
the same time, the sexual act is not necessarily limited and
performed in private, i.e., it is in the form of an "orgy". A
girl who is graduated from Sorbone University in Paris and now
is a high official in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has descri-
bed for me her initiation into one of these dowrehs. She said
that after returning from France, and after her appointment to
an official position in the Ministry, she started to see her
old high school friends. Very soon she became a member of
three different friendship dowrehs. But it was one of her
colleaugues in the Ministry, a middle-aged, unmarried, culture
Francais man, who invited her to one of their "library-meetings"
on every Thursday afternoons. After lunch, around two in the
afternoon, they went to a very expensive, nicely decorated
apartment in Shemiran. (The northern part of Tehran where rich
families live in expensive houses). This apartment was called
"library" by the man. There,-she saw some of her young and old
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colleaugues and officials of the Ministry, all from old aris-
tocratic and new rich families. There were not any procedural
ceremonies. The apartment was large and had many rooms in
addition to two bars. A table showed large amounts of hashish,
marijuana, cocain and if someone needed, L.S.D. Opium was also
provided in another room. After two hours the weekly games of
lesbianism., stripping, and bottle-playing began.
There are also notorious, Wester-type homosexual dowrehs
in Tehran.
4. Religious Dowrehs:
Many religious Moslem Persians, men and women, have their
own specifically religious dowrehs. In these gatherings, al-
ways limited to one sex, the members read Koran, discuss prob-
lems of religion or argue about social and political events
from the point of view of religion. Since religion is a cru-
cial aspect of Iranian life, religious dowrehs are numerous
and vary according to the particular religious inclinations of
each group.
There are mystical religious dowrehs. Persia is the home
of one of the great traditions of mysticism in Islam. The
Persian literature and philosophy provide an abundant source
of mystical expressions and experiences. But, there are also
many living mystics who do not concern therselves with texts.
They are living symbols, and indeed charismatic spiritual
leaders of large numbers of devoted followers. Every spiritual
leader claims to be a direct decendant of one of the Imams,
or particularly a decendent of the Prophet, or Imam Ali.
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Mysticism is prevalent particularly, among the old mem-
bers of upper classes and many of them belong to different
mystical sects, founded by a dervish, dead or living.
A typical upper class "religious-mysticist" dowreh meets
every Friday from morning to night. The spiritual leader sits
at the upper side of the room and the followers sit "under his
feet". Their meeting starts with kissing the hands of the
leader, listening to his sermon and talking about their own
problems and experiences. Since the membership in such dow-
rehs would entitle the member to all potential favors from
other members, the membership is very strict and each dowreh
creates an aura of secrecy around itself.
Another kind of religious dowreh is a more pragmatic, non-
mystical type. Generally, the members of these dowrehs, regard
mysticism as a corruption in Islam. They are fundamentalist
and dogmatic, sometimes militant and their sessions easily
turns into political meetings. These dowrehs are participa-
ted by the middle and lower class groups. Some of these dow-
rehs, while preserving the core membership, and keeping re-
gularity of meetings among the core group, extend the reli-
gious meeting to willing participants. Thus, they create a
kind of religious "teach-in" group. The meetings are open to
non-members and are advertised by flags and writeen papers.
These groups are one of the communicational grass root orga-
nization of powerful Iranian religious leaders called Ayatullah.
But religious dowrehs are not only Islamic. Christians,
Zoroastrians, Jews and Bahais have their own dowrehs. Famous
among these are Bahais' regular meetings which are secretive
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from the fear of persecution and the membership is mixed. Not
only religious discussions are part of each meeting, but poli-
tics and personal problems are talked about also.
We must however, differentiate between these "dowrehs"
and other secret or manifest religious gatherings in Iran.
There is, for instance, a religious gathering we described
called Rawze, which generally takes place in the house of a
wealthy person. Every month, especially during the religious-
ly important months of Ramazan and Moharram, wealthy Bazaaris
provide for ten or fifteen consecutive nights of religious
sermons by different Islamic priests (Mullahs). The parti-
cipation is open to everyone, men and women, and it is not a
limited group activity.
5. Intellectual Dowrehs:
We described "the fifty-three" members dowreh. It began
as an intellectual dowreh. In the same manner, writers, poets,
social critics, artists and intellectuals have their own dow-
rehs, which in at least one case, has turned into a formal
association with articulate aims and a constitution, that very
soon was opposed and banned by the government.
A typical intellectual dowreh is described by one member
as follows: the original core group was composed of a Western
educated linguist and translator, a writer and a modern poet.
These in turn initiated about 10 young students and 5 other
intellectuals. The meeting place was at the home of the poet.
Every week, Thursday afternoons, the group met. After discu-
ssing the social and political issues, the group concerned it-
self mainly with literature. Each week a new book was read by
all members and it was discussed by the group. Then a new work,
translated or written by a member during the previous week was
read, criticized and discussed. This particular dowreh was
basically concerned with literature, mainly Western.
Another intellectual dowreh, and a common kind, is a tea-
ching dowreh. A member told me that their group was composed
of 5 members, two of them university professors and Western
educated. Other three had degrees from Tehran University.
They met weekly to learn Islamic philosophy being taught by a
friend educated in Islamic philosophy and literature.
IV. Utilitarian Dowrehs:
There are numerous types of dowrehs, especially among the
economically active and among the new social strata called
technocrats, that can be identified as utilitarian. Earlier
we mentioned that Kadushin defines utilitarian social circles
as those that are formed for the enhancement of economic pur-
poses such as "Wall Street" or "Hollywood" clubs. Our descrip-
tion of utilitarian purposes follows the same definition. Since
the articulation of interests through formed associations is
not functionally useful for the economically active groups in
Iran, they organize in small, professional, non-formal associa-
tions with the clear intention of articulating and promoting
their group interests. These informal dowrehs may be regarded
as the Iranian type of economic "pressure groups." Small busi-
ness groups, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and many other profe-
ssional groups each have their own utilitarian dowrehs. These
dowrehs differ from political and friendship and cultural dow-
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rehs in two fundamental aspects; first, the membership in them
depends on the social status of individual, his economic posi-
tion and his professional skills. Second, the meetings are
generally spent on discussions about specific economic or pro-
fessional issues.
Examples:
A typical dowreh of Iranian Bazaari merchants consists of
eight socially recognized and famous merchants of the Tehran
Bazaar. These individuals are organized because of their mu-
tual economic concerns. They are all respected in the Bazaar
business community. The average age of the group is 56. Five
of them are dogmatically religious. Three are more liberal.
Over the past twenty years they have continuously and regular-
ly met every Friday afternoon. The meeting place rotates among
the membership. While they regard each other as "friends",
they do not discuss personal problems. During. their meeting
every development in the business community is discussed. They
talk about politics too. But politics is not their concern.
In fact, over the years they have developed a kind of unwritten
agenda for each week. At the beginning of every meeting, every-
one describes his concerns about the economic situation. Then
they proceed to plan their future actions. Sometimes, the
group talks about specific issues, such as the new economic
policies of the government or the fluctuations in the supply
and demands.
This dowreh is linked to seven other Bazaar dowrehs through
its members. It is interesting to know that the political and
cultural orientation of these seven dowrehs are in many aspects
different from the original one. Each of the five religious
members of original dowreh participate in five strictly re-
ligious dowrehs in which the business community adjusts its
economic policies with the demands of religious leaders. Two
of the more liberal members of the original dowreh participate
in political dowrehs. One of them told me that in his poli-
tical dowreh he meets with a former member of the officially
banned Tudeh party, an old member of aristocracy, a landlord,
and an intellectual who is an active member of the opposition
movement called the National Front (a loose federation of
followers of former prime minister Dr. Mossadegh).
Another example of utilitarian dowrehs, is a dowreh com-
prised of six industrialists whose main hobby is stockpiling
expensive Persian carpets and antiques. They meet every two
week on Thursday afternoon in the house of their oldest (and
wealthiest) member. He is not only active in business and po-
litics, but is an unofficially recognized trader of carpets.
Before Second World War he was a landlord. After 1950 he moved
into industry. Now he owns several textile factories. Over
the past 25 years he has been able to stockpile over 500 pre-
cious Persian carpets in his warehouse in the northern Tehran.
His basic instrument to find and buy these carpets has been
his dowreh.
These six men participate in various political and rec-
reational dowrehs, but their "carpet-antique dowreh" is strict-
ly devoted to discussing any issue related to carpets or antiques.
All members have known each other more than 30 years, and they
never engage in any trade of carpet or antique without consul-
ting with dowreh members.
There are many examples of "antique buyers and dealers"
dowrehs all over Iran, particularly in Isfahan, Shiraz and
Mashhad. An old landlord-aristocrat told me that in fact,
participating in this kind of dowreh is a necessary means
to be in the business of carpets and antiques. He said that
special antique dowrehs form a network, an unofficial and
strictly controlled market all over Iran. Thus, if a weal-
thy individual wants to buy a famous carpet or antique in
Mashhad, he will be able to find what he wants in thousands
of miles away in a small village in the south, with the assis-
tance of members of doTrehs in different areas. In the same
way, if an antique piece is "discovered" in a remote village
in the south, all interested persons will be informed in a
short period of time and the price will be set for the piece.
Another example of utilitarian dowrehs is a dowreh com-
prised of 5 Tehrani dentists. They are all educated in the
U.S. They have met regularly for the past six year's every
week. During their meeting they have specified their areas
of specialization, regardless of their degree. For instance,
they have agreed that only two of them should perform surgery.
Thus, they have been able to determine the monthly, "quotas"
of patients, each of them would treat. When a patient goes
to see one of them, if his quota is completed by the end of
the month he "hands over" the patient to the one with less
number of patients.
5
NOTES ON SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL
ASPECTS OF DOWREH
I. Is dowreh a group activity limited to certain classes
or social strata in Iranian society? The answer is a qualified
yes. We cannot, empirically, hypothesize that dowreh is only
a middle or upper class habit. One characteristic, however,
should be emphasized which is that dowreh is an urban pheno-
menon. It is well-known that Iranian society has been and to
a large degree still is, an agricultural society. The country
is not industrialized yet and the refo-ms of the government,
after 1960, has not transformed the traditional social struc-
ture of Iran. But urbanization in Iran is not a modern pheno-
menon, although the modern cities developed in recent times.
Iran has witnessed the growth and decline of large and
heavily populated cities throughout her long history. Max
Weber was among the first social scientists who observed the
importance of cities in oriental societies. In modern times,
the old pattern of village-city has survived. The Iranian
village was a small isolated, usually self-sufficient unit.
The cities, on the other hand, were the center of artisans,
merchants, and the residence of landowners with their guilds
and quarters. After land reform in Iran, the pattern has not
drastically changed. The villages are still separated from
urban areas, and the city dwellers are still the strata usually
identified as middle and upper classes. And every city still
has its special professional "quarter", and non-official guilds.
The number of city population, however, is growing by the
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increase in the number of workers and other urban laborers.
We do not observe the dowreh network in the villages. Pro-
bably because generally the number of the population of each
village is too large, and the work patterns do not permit su-
fficient leisure time.
But even in the cities, the dowreh network cannot be assu-
med to extend enough to include all segments of the city popu-
lation. This is because the membership of a dowreh depends on
at least two material preconditions: On the one hand the in-
dividual must enjoy a certain level of financial security and
he/she must be able to afford the costs of arranging a social
gathering at his/her home on a regular basis. On the other
hand, a certain amount of leisure time is a necessary condi-
tion for participating or having dowrehs. Thus, we can exclude
the members of lower classes such as working class from those
strata who usually participate in dowrehs. Consequently, the
number and variations of dowreh will increase by going up the
social ladder, i.e., from lower middle class to upper classes.
What can be assumed to be the linkage point between dowreh
network and other social structures in Iranian society is a
different form of social intercourse (hence, a different so-
cial phenomenon) in the cities and the villag-s, i.e., the so-
cial habit of gathering daily or weekyly in the tea-houses,
mosques and the homes of wealthy persons. Not only each occu-
pational group (guilds), like painters or construction workers,
have their own meeting place, in a teahouse or a mosque, but
mainly because of religious duties, as we mentioned earlier,
groups meet, at least weekly or monthly, in the home of a rich,
religious individual. Since many individual members of diffe-
rent dowrehs participate in the social gatherings in tea-houses,
mosques or various houses, the dowreh network becomes connec-
ted with other groups and strata in society. These linkage
points are important because the interpersonal communication
provides for the channels of flowing information, particularly
for the flow of political information.
It has been observed that political rumors play an impor-
tant communicational role in Iranian society, and that there
are recognizable lines of the flow of information from upper
classes to lower ones. It is through dowreh network and its
linkages with other segments of society that the center of poli-
tIcal power becomes related to periphery; it is also through
these channels that political communication between ruling
elite and the mass of population occurs. These channels also
provide the possible roads of social mobility. Many members
of lower classes have been able to move upward through these
channels.
II. Undoubedtly, dowreh is not a modern social phenomenon
in Iran. It is rooted in Iranian history and culture. But
the ever intensifying process of industrialization of the
country is disintegrating the old patterns of culture and social
behavior. Not only the culture of the peasants is in the pro-
cess of transformation, but the cultural patterns of urban life
is changing every day. With the growth of modern cities and
the intensification of the process of urbanizatiron,. social
patterns such as extended family are forced to disintegrate.
In the same way, many traditional social phenomena in Iran are
deeply influenced by industrialization and urbanization. It
can be hypothesized that many traditional formations of dow-
reh system are either destroyed by modern developments or are
in the process of structural change. Such behavioral patterns
as intimate relationship, and face-to-face interaction depend
on geographical proximity which is not compatible with the de-
mands of an industrialized economy. Like family relations, the
group relations based on geographical proximity cannot remain
unchanged in an economy which mobilizes individuals and sca-
tters them continuously in different areas. Furthermore, the
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introduction of modern means of communication such radio, tele-
vision, modern forms of association such as impersonal parti-
cipation in clubs, and modern ways of life, etc., all destroy
the very social conditions upon which the dowreh network have
operated. However, one cannot exaggerate the impact of moder-
nization on the traditional aspects of social life in Iran be-
cause the essential structure of Iranian social life has not
changed yet. We mean, of course, the political system of Iran.
Not only the operation of politics has remained basically tra-
ditional, but the stifling policies of the government have
revived the traditional patterns of communication. It seems
that the dowreh network has flourished in recent years. Per-
haps it will survive into predictable future unless the poli-
tical system encourages the formation of associations and free
participation of individuals in the system.
III. It is possible to document the existence of dowreh
network in the past two hundred years of Iranian history. And,
consequently, it can be hypothesi7ed that the phenomenon of dow-
reh has deep historical roots in Iranian society. The attempt
to document the historical roots of dowreh is not too success-
ful because there does not exist too many studies of historical
sociology of Iran.
In the past two hundred years, during the reign of Qajar
dynasty, many members of upper classes had their weekly and
monthly dowrehs, the most famous among them, the political,
religious and intellectual ones.
Ann Lambton maintains that various forms of secret socie-
ties have always existed in Islamic Persia. The Persians by
forming secret societies have sought to obtain their political
and social rights:
"Through membership of these secret societies
and indulgence in covert activities the Per-
sians experienced a satisfaction and sense of
achievements and purpose often denied to them
in other fields." 1
Consequently, the first impact of the West was felt through
the informal dowrehs of intellectuals and reformers; and secret
societies "have played no small part in the early phases of
the movement for westernization and modernization, which led
up to the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-6." 2
The Qajar dynasty came to power with the assistance of
Turkish tribal forces and continued to depend heavily upon
them. The despotic rulership of Qajar kings continued without
1- Ann K. S. Lambton "Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution
of 1905-1906," St. Antony's Papers, No. 4 Middle Eastern
Affairs, No. 1 1958
2- Ibid.
a major challenge until the religiously motivated movement
against the concession of a Tobacco Monopoly to an English
Company took place in 1891-1892.1 As Lambton observes, this
revolt was primarily against the misgovernment of the Shah.2
People's discontent finally had been crystallized in the be-
lief that the monopolies and concessions granted by the Shah
to foreigners were a threat to Islam and the independence of
Iran. About three decades earlier, Iranian intellectuals and
rpformers who were not religious, but were dissatisfied with
the conditions of the country began to meet and organize in
secret. One of the first group of these "modernizers" be-
came notorious as a freemason party, and their lodge was called
Faramushkhaneh. It is alleged that a number of those who later
became the leaders of tie constitutional revolution were among
the members. 3 The foundation of the first Faramushkhaneh was
attirbuted to Mirza Malkuz Khan who was in favor of absolute
westernization and the adaption of European ways of life. A
number of prominent officials and bureaucrats are reputed to
have been members of the group, and it is alleged that even
the king himself, Nasir ud-Din had contacts with it. But even-
tually he became suspicious of the whole secretive society and
in 1891 a notice appeared in the official gazette banning it.
The group, however, continued its activities under a different
name. Towards the end of Nasir ud-Din Shah's reign, the forma-
1- See for example, Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebelion in
Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-92,(London: Frank Press
& Co., 1966)
2- Lambton, Op. Cit., P. 47
3- Ibid.
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tion of secret and semi-secret groups flourished. The semi-
secret groups became known as anjuman-ha-i milli (nationa-
list societies). These anjumans were indeed discussion groups
organized to learn and discuss the liberation of the people
from despotism and the benefits of freedom, justice and edu-
cation. "Discontent with the existing conditions and a belief
in modernization were the two things that held their members
together."1 With the passing of time, these societies became
increasingly nationalist and made use of the new forces of na-
tionalism in their struggle to overthrow the despotism. Nasir
ud-Din was assassinated in 1896 by a member of one of these
anjumans. A significant characteristic feature of these anju-
mans was their relations with the Shi'ite religious leaders
called Ulama. And. Ulama increased their influence upon the
mass of people through their followers.
The secret societies were not limited to the capital city.
In Tabriz, Kerman, Isfahan and other cities the secret groups
formed to enlighten the people. Two members of a secret so-
ciety in Tabriz, composed mainly of religious and merchant
classes, founded, shortly before the outbreak of the Constitu-
tional Revolution, a library which became the meeting place
of the supporters of reform and modernization.2 Anjumans were
also formed in foreign countries such as Turkey and Iraq.
In 1901 there were social unrest in Tehran and by 1903
opposition to the government became more open. In 1904, some
1- Ibid., P. 49
2- Ibid., P. 52
of the various groups which had been meeting independently came
to the conclusion that time was ripe to collaborate with others
for the overthrow of the despotism. A secret meeting of some
sixty persons was held in May 1904. The majority of the group
belonged to the religious class, but it also included merchants,
members of craft guilds, members of the bureaucracy, two Zorea-
strians, and a tribal leader. The present individuals "took
an oath on the Koran to preserve the secrets of the group and
to strive for the establishment of a code of laws and justice
and the overthrow of the rule of tyranny and injustice." 2 After
speaches made by membersa program of action, consisting of
eighteen articles, was drawn up and a revolutionary committee
of nine persons appointed. At about the same time, another
secret society, Anuman-i Makhfi formed to organize people
for revolution. In April 1905, a group of merchants sought
sanctuary in a religious shrine called Shah Abd ul-Azim to
protest the conduct of a Belgian who was the director of the
Customs Administration. This led to subsequent events of the
revolution.
Even through this short account of the background of Cons-
titutional Movement in Iran, the social and political signifi-
cance of dowreh network becomes clear. In fact, as Lambton
observes, "there was no other agency by which, in the existing
circumstances, this preparation could have been carried through." 3
As we observed earlier, the pattern of secret group activity
1- Ibid., P. 53
2- Ibid.
3- Ibid., P. 60
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was repeated during Reza Shah's reign. Also, many groups who
opposed the present government organize and meet secretly
through their dowrehs.
It may be hypothesized that whenever the political system
increases the pressure over the population, the dowreh network
flourishes, at the moment that the system allows the free for-
mation of political organizations, many political dowrehs will
transform into formal associations. This happened during Reza
Shah and immediately after his abdication in 1941.
At present, the dowreh network is an indispensible part
of the political system of Iran.
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APPENDIX A.
A NOTE ON IRAN'S SOCIAL PROFILE
Iran is one of the oldest countries in Asia. The overall
size of the country is 628,000 square miles, or about one-fifth
of the United States. It is on the same latitude as, and rough-
ly equal in extent to, the States of Kansaf Okalahoma, Texas,
Colorado and New Mexico combined and has, incidentally, about
the same population.1 (In 1966 more than 25 million, in 1978
estimated 35 million).
In the north Iran shares the same borders with the Soviet
Union (The Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan,
the easpian Sea, and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkeme-
nistan). In the east Iran is bounded by Afghanistan and Pakis-
tan; in the south by Persian Gulf, and in the-west by Iraq and
Turkey. In the past, the Persian Empire included the whole of
the Caucasus, the greater part of Turkemenistan and Uzbekistan,
Afghanistan, northern India as far as Delhi, and large areas
of present-day Iraq and Turkey, including Baghdad, Mosul,
Erzerum and Trebizond.
Present-day Iran has inherited from the past an unusually
heterogenous country from every point of view. 2 Topographi-
cally and climatically it includes high mountain ranges, vast
deserts, tropical low lands, and hot dry plains near the Per-
sian gulf. The major limiting factor to economic growth is
water resources, with only about 13 percent of the country's
1- L. P. Elwell-Sutton, A Guide To Iranian Area Study (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: J.W. Edwards Publisher, 1952) P. 6
2- John K. Friesen and Richard V. Moore , IRAN, Country Profiles,
A Publication of the population council, October 1972, P. 1
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land cultivable. At present, approximately one-third of this
1land is under cultivation, even though the economy is basica-
lly agricultural and not industrialized. The fertile and po-
pulous areas of the country lie for the most part along the
lower slopes of the mountain ranges.
Socially, the country is as diverse and heterogenous as
it is geographically. A substantial portion of the population
is of Turkish, Arabic, Caucasian, or central Asian origin. Al-
though Farsi (Persian) is the official language, and the cen-
tralization policies of government has made it the only lan-
guage taught at schools all over the nation, Iran's rich ethnic
mosaic sustains the use of many other languages and dialects
which are the distinguishing characteristics of nationalities.
In northern province of Azerbaijan the population is mainly
Turki (Azeri)-speaking. To the south are the Kurdish tribes,
and beyond them the Lur tribes with their own language and cos-
tumes. In the south there is Khuzistan where the population
is Lur, Persian, and mostly Arab. In the central provinces,
the Bakhtiari tribes live to the west of Isfahan, and further
to the southeast are the Turkish Qashqai and the Arab-Turkish
Khamesh tribes. The Persian Gulf coastal population is a mix-
ture of Arab and Persian with a small negro community. The
eastern provinces have also a mixed population, predominantly
Baluchis, Arabs, Turks and Afgha;1ns. In Khorasan there are large
Turkoman tribes,
The chief minority communities in the country are the
1- Ibid.
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Armenians, the Jews, and the Assyrians.
The diversity in natural conditions and the composition
of population, is also reflected in Persian culture, histo-
ry and pattern of social development. The economic, social
and cultural manifestations of "uneven development" can be
seen all over Iran. At one extreme are the nomads, still
numbering more than 15 percent of the population and at the
other extreme the westernized and sophisticated elite concen-
trated at the capital, where they occupy the positions of
power and wealth and control the government and business. In
the middle, there are the majority of illitrate peasants (at
least 60 percent of the total population) and a minority of
urbanized traditional and modern middle classes.
While there are many local differences between the various
tribes of Iran, their basic features of life is the same. Their
way of life is conditioned by the mountainous nature of the
country and the extremes of temperature and climate. The basis
of the nomad's livelihood is his cattle, and the unceasing
search for fodder for his livestock turns him into a wanderer
and carries him from one grazing land to another. Grazing
areas form a large part of the land that is neither inhabited
nor cultivated- some 80 percent of the territory.
Traditionally tribes lived also on hunting and raids on
the herds of other tribes and highway rubbery. There were
clashes with the government too. The nomads represented a
military and political force opposed to the central Qovern-
ment. The policy of government, however, from the beginning
of the reign of Reza Shah until present time has been the
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settlement, sometimes by force, of the nomadic tribes.
The pattern of village life in Iran is as old as the
country's history. It was established at an early date and
has altered little during the succeeding centuries. 1 Iranian
villages are very small and isolated from each other and from
urban centers. In the majority of them the population does
not exceed a hundred. A typical village consists of a clus-
ter of baked mud houses built around a small square or near
a small mosque. These houses usually do not have more than
two rooms and a small yard surrounded by a mud wall. To pro-
tect the peasant and his family from cold and hot weather, the
rooms are windowless. The peasant's possessions are few and
his way of life simple and primitive -sleeping blankets, coo-
king utensils, a teapot and a couple of trunks for clothing
and food. The poorest usually share the living room with
their livestock. Their subsistance food consists mostly of
bread, yogurt and tea with occasional rice, eggs, mutton or
beef and some fruits. In the daily life of peasants money is
little used. The growing of cereal crops by the most primi-
tive agricultural methods is the villager's main source of
livelihood, as well as his principal occupation, the cycle
of plowing, sowing and harvesting goes on uninterrupted. Health
conditions among the peasants are as poor as among the tribes.
A large number of epidemics and chronic diseases such as ma-
laria and a variety of intestinal diseases are the main health
1- For a brief but insightful description of an Iranian village
in recent times, see: William Green Miller, "Hosseinabad:
A Persian Village," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4
(Autumn, 1961) PP. 483-4&98
problems.
Many aspects of tribal and village life are reflected in
the social life of town and cities. In fact, it seems that
many Iranian cities evolved from village originals.' The main
square was the center, and around it was built the principal
mosque, the palaces and dwellings of the ruler and other elites,
later on the government and municipal offices, and most impor-
tant of all the bazaar. At the present time the Iranian city
still has preserved some of its essential historical characte-
ristic.features. For instance, each section houses its parti-
cular craft or commodity -wood-work, textiles, copper and
brass,, china and glass, rugs and carpets, kitchen utensils,
clothing and shoes. The two socially and culturally important
places in the city are bazaar and mosques. "The bazaar is much
more than a market. It is above all the social and political
hub of the city's life, the habitat of the middle class, un-
known in the villages, which yet wields enormous influence in
the country's affairs." 2 While the bazaar constitutes the eco-
nomic backbone of the city, the mosques form the cultural and
communicational skeleton of it. The majority of the population
in the cities are Moslems and except the modern middle class
in large moderized cities, most of the traditional classes
attend prayer and sermon sessions in the mosques daily or
weekly. Not only individuals socialize in the mosques, but
they discuss political and cultural issues.
1- Elwell-Sutton, Op. Cit., P. 29
2- Ibid.
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Historically Iran has been a basically agricultural and
rural country. But the world-wide modernizing forces of the
last 100 years are bringing rapid and far-reaching changes
throughout the country, and nowhere the impacts of moderniza-
tion can be seen and felt as in the cities. The industrialist
and secularist policies of Reza Shah created a modern working
class and a new, urbanized modern middle class, both of which
do not depend on the traditional economy. The pace of moder-
nization accelerated after second World War. The land reform
in 1963 and the sudden increase in oil prices in 1973, have
had devastating effects on the economy and culture of Iran.
In the cities the opposing extremes of the process of
change can be seen in every aspects. A large number of pea-
sants who could not receive land through the program of land
distribution, because they did not live on the farm but worked
there as day-laborer, have come to the cities. These and an
increasing number of peasants who could not cultivate their
small share of land due to the lack of necessary capital have
sold the lands to agrobusinesses and have created an utterly
poor and unemployed urban population which sorrounds the ci-
ties.1 The city itself is in the process of mushroom growth
while it has an insufficient and inefficient public services.
At one extreme is those modern, European parts of the city with
the most expensive modern apartments and housing. At the other
extreme is the slums inhabited by newly arrived peasants. At
one extreme is the tendency to assimilate a modern way of life,
1- MERIP REPORTS No. 71, (Middle East Research and Information
Project) October, 1978.
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strongest among the professional classes, the government offi-
cials, upper strata of army officers and political and econo-
mic elites. At the other extreme is the illitracy, poverty
and blindful acceptance of all aspects of traditionalism. Not
only the economic gap between the two extremes is vast, but
the cultural and social gap is also enormous. Located in the
middle of these two extremes is a growing middle class which
is increasingly dependent on the modernization process. The
rajority of Iranian middle class accepts the Western features
of life and is conscious of living a more prosperous and con-
venient life with the facilitles that modernization brings
about, such as electricity, social services, television and
cinema, But their "rising expectations" are not confined to
economic demands. They are the most nationalist and politica-
lly aware and they and their children, the students, are those
who oppose the autocratic rule of the Shah.
The recent crisis in Iran can be viewed as the inevitable
outcome of a process that we outlined some of its features
above. The social picture of the present Iran is one of an
old-established and deeply-rooted social and economic and po-
litical way of life undergoing devastating change in all as-
pects. So far the changes have effected only a minority of
population through a process of uneven development. They also
have created the opportunity for some to benefit most. But
the process of change can not stop. It is accelerating.
APPENDIX B.
SOME POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
It is appropriate to summarize our analysis to find out
the most distinguishable characteristics of the social pheno-
menon called "dowreh". Dowreh is a socio-political phenome-
non, which is of major significance in Iran. What is called
a dowreh is an amalgam of individuals, an informal group of
individuals, who form their association in pursuit of a so-
cial end, and who always meet periodically on a regular basis,
usually rotating the meeting place among themselves. The
institution of dowreh is used by members to discuss, organize,
relate and communicate with each other. As a rule, dowreh
gatherings are weekly, but some may meet only once a month,
others more often. While most Iranians participate in one or
two dowrehs, those who are financially well off and are socia-
lly or politically active usually attend more than two dowrehs
each week. This gives a socially significant aspect to dowreh,
i.e., it connects different dowrehs. There are various and
functionally different types of dowrehs; political, recreational,
friendship, religion, intellectual, etc. Some dowrehs have
names, known to the members, some do not. Some are attended
only by men, some are attended both by men and women. Essen-
tially dowreh is an urban social phenomenon and a middle and
upper class social habit. The number of members of a dowreh is
not specified by any social norm. The usual number, however,
in a single dowreh is more than 5 and less than 20. The mee-
tings are usually held in an individuals's home. The nature
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of communication and interpersonal relationship in a dowreh
depends upon the functional aspect of dowreh for the whole
membership. However, the social and political commUnicational
role of dowreh becomes significant because dowrehs are related
to each other. Since many members of a dowreh, in turn will
participate in several other dowrehs, these small group asso-
ciations become connected to each other and thus, they create
a social network which is a pursuasive means of transmission
of economic, social and political information. More important,
many of upper class dowrehs are group formation of individuals
who have personal ties and also can be identified as cliques
and factions. Thus, dowreh network creates the channels of
social and political mobility for each member. The structural
role of dowreh network, therefore, is not limited to the trans-
mission of information; it is one of the major paths to power
positions in society.
As we mentioned earlier, this Iranian phenomenon is of
sociological and political significance. It is, therefore,
possible to explain it both sociologically and politically.
SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
I. Definition, Structure and Function of Small Group:
a. Definition:
There is major agreement among sociologists and social
psychologists that one of the most obvious reasons for a
group to be formed, or for a person to join a group is that
"the group itself is the object of the nedd."1 People start
1- Darwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., Group Dynamics,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1960), P. 75
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to interact in a group either because they enjoy one another's
company, or there is an interest in the activity. In the la-
tter cas , a group might be a means to attair. some ends out-
side the group. Thus, the group is an instrument for satis-
fying needs.
The individual who consitute a dowreh, form a group. Zan-
der and Cartwright define a group as:
"A collection of individuals who have rela-
tions to one another that make them inter-
dependent to some significant degree." 1
According to Paul Hare a "group" has five characterist-
ics which differentiates it from other "collections of indi-
viduals": the members of the group are in interaction with
one another. They share a common goal and set of norms, which
give direction and limits to their activity. They also deve-
lop a set of roles and a network of interpersonal attraction,
which serve to differentiate them from other groups. 2
With the definition that Hare gives for small and prima-
ry groups, it is possible to categorize dowreh under these
types. He defines small group or primary group as a collec-
tion of individuals having intimate, face-to-face relation-
ship.
"Small groups include all those having from
two to about twenty members. However, even
larger groups may be considered 'small' if
face-to-face interaction is possible and
collections of fewer than twenty individuals
may actually include several small groups." 3
1- Ibid. -
2- Paul Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research,(New York: The
Free Press, 1962) P. 10
3- Ibid.
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We must point out that the concept of primary group is
one of the important contributions of Charles Colley. In a
well-known passge Colley defines the concept as:
"By Primary group I mean those characterized
by intimate face-to-face association and
cooperation. They are primary in several
senses, but chiefly in that they are funda-
mental in forming the social nature and ideals
of the individual. The result of intimate
association, psychologically, is a certain
fusion of individualities in a common whole, so
that one's very self, for many purposes
at least, is the common life and purposes of
the group. Perhaps the simplest way of des-
cribingz this wholeness is by saying that it
is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy
and mutual identification for which "we" is
the natural expression. One lives in the
feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims
of his will in that feeling." 1
In Cooley's view, the most important spheres of the inti-
mate association and cooperation are the family, the play-
group of children and the neighborhood or community group of
elders. He believes that these are "practically universal,
belonging to all times and all stages of development, and are
accordingly a chief basis of what is universal in human nature
and human ideals." 2
The social importance of primary groups in Cooley's view,
is that they are "springs of life," not only for the individu-
al, but for the social institutions as well. What makes them
the origins of human nature and the source of the human virtu-
es, appears to be their three characteristics; the face-to-face
relation, the temporal priority in experience, and the feeling
of the whole as expressed by "we".
1- Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization, (New York: The Free
Press, 1950) P. 23
2- Ibid., P. 24
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Edward Shils also gives a definition for primary groups:
"By primary group we mean a group characterized
by a high degree of solidarity, informality in
the code of rules which regulate the behavior
of its members, and autonomy in the creation
of these rules. The solidarity involves a
close identification of the members with any
symbols of the group which might have grown
up."i
Shils, however, maintains that while small size and phy-
sical proximity (face-to-face relation) have been regarded as
elements in the definition of the primary group, they must be
regarded as conditions affecting the formation of primary gr-
oups. 2
Other sociologists also have tried to define primary and
small groups. Charles E. King writes:
"The small group refers to a collectivity of
persons of sufficiently limited numbers so
that the persons are in direct, interper-
sonal, informal or formal relationships and
share collective and/or like interests and
goals." 3
Adrian Mayor, instead of using the label "small groups",
identifies them as quasi-groups:
"They possess a degree of organization, but are
nevertheless not groups. They can be called
interactive, quasi-groups, for they are based
on an interacting set of people." 4
The reason that Mayor calls these kind of groups, quasi-
groups is that he thinks they differ fundamentally from the
group and the association proper. He believes that they are
1- Edward A. Shils, "The Study of the Primary Group," in
Daniel Lerner and Harold Laswell, The Policy Sciences,
(Stanford University Press, 1951) P. 44
2- Ibid.
3- Charles E. Kind, The Sociology of Small Groups,(New York:
Pageant Press, 1962) P. 2
4- Adrian C. Mayor, "Quasi-groups in the Study of Complex
Societies," in Micheal Banton, ed., The social Anthropo-
logy of Complex Societies,(New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1966) PP.
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ego-centered, in the sense of. depending for their very exis-
tence on a specific person as a central organization focus.
Moreover, the actions of any member are relevant in so far as
they are interactions between him and the ego or the ego's in-
termed iary. 1
Since some of the criteria to distinguish a primary
group from other kinds were disputed by different sociologi-
sts, Elsworth Faris gives a definition which pertains to be
comprehensive:
"The nature of primary group, lies not in its
parts but in its organization. It depends
not upon its spatial contguity but upon its
functional interaction. It can be described
neither by statistical enumeration nor by
spatial measurement. More is involved than
separate elements. In addition to space there
is also time. The primary group cannot exist
without memories; it cannot endure without
purposes. No mechanical or spatial description
is adequate. It is a changing organization of
functional activities tending toward an end,
influenced by its past and guided by its pur-
poses and its future. It is not a mechanism, it
is a part of life." 2
b) Structure:
Three types of small or primary groups are much discussed
in the literature; kinship, neighbors and friends.
Until the late 1940's many sociologists had adopted the
view that there is not much need to study primary groups in
a modern industrial society because primary groups could not
1- Ibid.
2- Ellsworth Faris, "The Primary Group: Essence and Accident,"
The American Journal of Sociology,No. 1, July 1932, P. 50
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survive in such societies. They believed that industrial
bureaucratic organizations were substituting for primary
groups and they were more effective than primary groups in
achieving the same goals. Moreover, industrial bureaucratic
organizations required social conditions which were antithe-
tical to primary groups. One of the major conditions so re-
quired was the need for primary group members to engage in
differential geographic and occupational mobility.1
Litwak and Szelenyi maintain that in order for extended
kin groups to remain viable, they must learn to communicate
and exchange services in other than face-to-face situations;
in order for neighbors to remain viable, they must learn to
exchange services and communicate despite short membership
turnover; and for friendships to remain viable, friends must
learn to do both, in addition to learring how to deal with
the most idiosyncratic aspects of life. 2
Neighborhoods are characterized by geographical proximi-
ty of members. Consequently, neighbors tend to be in face-
to-face contact with one another. But industrialization re-
quires that people in a given neighborhood have short tenure,
it follows that if neighborhoods are to survive industrial
society, they must stress face-to-face contact without one of
the dimensions of a classical primary group, i.e., permanent
membership.3 The same is true of kinship system and pressures
1- Eugene Litwak and Ivan Szelenyi, "Primary Group Structure
and Their Functions: Kin, Neighbors and Friends," American
Sociological Review, 34, June 1969, No. 3, PP. 465"6~
2- Ibid., P. 466
3- Ibid.
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for differential mobility in a technological society. How-
ever, unlike the other two groups, the individual has more
options in choosing his friends.
As we discussed earlier, Iran is a developing country
and is not industrialized yet. Thus, all requirements of
classical primary groups can be observed in their formation
in Iran.
Edward Shils distinguishes three types of groups, all
of which are, in some sense, primary.1 The first type he
identifies as "primordial" primary group. This is the group
united by common blood or common neighborhood. Membership in
such a group is involuntary and produces a traditional out-
look respectful of long term identities which are not sub-
ject to rational choice or calculation. The second type is
the "personal" primary group, distinguished by the voluntary
attachment of individuals who like one another personally.
The voluntary nature of group membership distinguishes it
from the former. The third type in Shils view, can be dis-
tinguished as "ideological" primary group made up of those
who share a common ideal to which they are intensely devoted.
This type of group shares with the primordial group the fee-
ling for the "sacred" quality of their union. In the one
case it is the traditional order which calls forth awe and
respect on the part of group members; in the other case, it
is the new order, the "cause", which is holy. Both of these
1- EdwardShils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties,"
British Journal of Sociolog, (June, 1957)
99
types stand in constrast to the more casual and non-charis-
matic personal primary group. The personal and the ideolog-
[cal group share the feature of voluntariness which is absent
in the primordial group.1
In all of these types of groups the ties that bind the
members of each group together are strongly affective, inti-
mate, "organic", and enjoin a broadly interpreted mutual res-
ponsibility or relatively unconditional loyalty to the par-
ticular others who make the group.2
c. Function:
The most obvious explanation of membership in a group is
that the group provides satisfaction or personal response. In
other words, it brings psychic gratification or enjoyment.
Thus, the primary group may be said to have the associated
function of training and support. 3
According to Festinger small groups occupy a strategic
position as determiners of the behavior and attitudes of their
members. Because attitudes and behavior patterns are commu-
nicated or learned from other people, it is plausible to su-
ppose that face-to-face communication among members of a so-
cial group would be a method through which much of the deve-
lopment of these attitudes and behavior patterns would occur.4
Thus, to say that primary groups "train" members means
that the group aids in the psychological development of the
1- Michael Olmsted, The Small up, New York: Random House,
1967) PP. 58-59
2- Ibid.
3- Ibid., PP. 46-47
4- Leon Festinger, Stanley Schachter, Kurt Back, Social Press-
ure in Informal Groups,(New York: Harper & Bros, 1950)P. 3
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Individual by providing the context in which his intellectual
and emotional development take place. The most prominent ins-
tant of this process is to be found in that primary group kn-
own as family.1
Moreover, primary group membership gives the individual
an opportunity for expressive behavior. Josephine Klein notes
that the individual needs his group assurance that he is val-
ued; he gains it by behaving in a manner acceptable to the
group; and when he does this, he gives the others that same
assurance of individual worth that he gains from them. Klein
observes that it is pleasant to talk, to say what comes to
mind, and to hear what others have in their mind. The mutual
exchange of self-expressive behavior, in Klein's view, is mu-
tually gratifying because this behavior has been learned in
circumstances which were gratifying. Klein says that self-
expression is not only healing, i.e, serving a "cathartic"
function, but a measure of social control, and a means for
clarification, leading the individual to solving his problem.2
II. Social Networks:
The concept of network has been developed in sociology
to analyze and describe those social processes involving
links across, rather than within, group and category limits.
The interpersonal links that arise out of common group mem-
bership are as much part of the total social network as are
1- Olmsted, Op, Cit., P. 47
2- Josephine Klein, Working With Groups, (London: Hutchinson
& Co., 1961), PP.54-60
101
those that link persons in different groups. 1
Networks have been defined as "matrices of social links"
or as "social fields made up of relationships between people." 2
Networks include all individuals who find themselves in a
given field, and who are within direct or indirect reach of
each other. That is to say, they include all individuals who
are connected directly with at least one other member of that
network.3
Network analysis attempts to explain how communities can
be held together in the absence of strong governments or or-
ganized formal groups. Moreover, it explains how class and
other divisions within a society can be made tolerable by
the presence of cross-cutting alliances. It also helps to
explain how concensus within a community can emerge as the re-
sult of the exchange of opinions among individuals and how
such consensus can contribute to the process of nation buil-
ding.4
Network analysis also provides insight into the indivi-
dual's relationship and functioning within his society. The
degree of social involvement of individuals differ. Some
individuals may be deeply involved and extraordinary influ-
ential in their society because of their many active links
with other members. Thus, a man who is a member of many
groups, even if he is not clever or important, will gain more
1- J. A. Barnes, "Network and Political Process" In Marc J.
Swartz ed., Local Level Politics, Op.Cit., P. 109
2- Mayor, Op. Cit., P. 98
3- Steffen Schmidt, et al, Op, Cit., P. XXIV
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information and more experience than is available to a man
with fewer contacts. If, in addition, his contacts are among
influential groups, he will have access to information which
members might not have been able to obtain in any other way. 1
Thus, for example, a network analysis explains how what
may have been as a dispute between two individuals can expand
through the progressive involvement of persons directly or in-
directly connected with the original antagonists, into a feud
thnat eventually divides most of the community into two oppo-
sing camps. It also explains how overlapping alliances, in
which other individuals may be allied dynamically with both
antagonists in a conflict, produce mediators who work to abate
the conflict. 2
The most important aspect of network analysis is its con-
tribution to an understanding of a society's communication
system. A network model suggests how numerous radiating
chains of linked individuals can pass a message throughout
a society without the aid of mass media. Similarly it shows
how the receipt of the same message from diverse sources ena-
bles the receiver to assess its accuracy. 3
III. Dowreh as a Small (Primary) Group Activity and
The Social Network of Dowrehs
It is possible to hypothesize that the individuals who
form a dowreh, for whatever purpose, engage in a small group
activity and enter into the membership of a primary group.
1- Mayor, OpCit., P. 93
2- Schmidt et al,.Op Cit.
3- Ibid.
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Since Iran is not yet industrialized, the influence of tradi-
tion on the individual's social behavior is extensive and con-
sequently the kinship, neighborhood and friendship ties are
very strong. Moreover, the social conditions help to rein-
force the influence of tradition and facilitate the formation
of primary groups. One of the fundamental features of these
groups, i.e., the face-to-face relationship is easily possi-
ble in Iranian society because the country is not yet indust-
rialized, the relationships are still personal and the exten-
ded family has not been destroyed. The influence of family,
particularly, is very strong in Iranian society. Not only
the focus of all Iranian life is the family, but the total
life of an individual is dominated by family relationships.
"An Iranian", says Richard W. Gable, "is born into family and
1
he never leaves it."
As we observed earlier, the phenomenon of dowreh, as a
group activity, assumes different characteristics according
to the functions for which it has been formed. What are
structurally stable and do not change with different purposes
of the individual members are the nature of group and the
structure of dowreh.
Those individuals who enter into the group activity of
dowreh start to have relations to one another that make them
"interdependent" in many respects. Thus, they form a group,
by definitions we proposed earlier. It is possible to find
all those five characteristics which Paul Hare mentions as
1- Richard W. Gable, "Culture and Administration in Iran",
The Middle East Journal, 13 (1959) P. 410
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the distinguishable aspects of a group, among the characteris-
tics of dowreh. The members of a dowreh are in interaction
with each other on a regular basis. They share some common
goals and set of norms which give direction and limits to
their activity. They also develop a set of roles, and a net-
work of interpersonal relationships, which serve to separate
and differentiate them from other groups.
The number of members in a dowreh is limited, and we can
find the three characteristics of primary group which Cooley
mentions among members of a dowreh. The relationship in a
dowreh is face-to-face, the experience is shared as a tempo-
ral priority for the individual, and there exists a feeling
of the whole, as expressed by we, among the members. In other
words, a high degree of solidarity, informality in the code of
rules which regulate the behavior of members and autonomy in
the creation of these rules, can be distinguished as the cha-
racteristics of interpersonal relationships in a dowreh.
The group activity of dowreh cannot be classified and ca-
tegorized easily, since with the intention of individuals, the
function of dowreh for the group assumes different natures.
Not only there are kinship, neighborhood and friendship dow-
rehs, but we can find the three types of primordial, personal
and ideological group activity among different dowrehs.
What should be stressed, however, is the voluntary na-
ture of group activity in a dowreh. The individuals must
choose the membetship of different dowrehs voluntarily.
The group activity of dowreh being a primary group acti-
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vity, we can explain some of the functions of dowreh as func-
tions of primary groups in general. The membership in a dow-
reh provides satisfaction and personal response for members.
It brings psychic gratifications and enjoyment. It may be
said that a dowreh has also the associated functions of trai-
ning and support. However, it is only an empirical research
that can establish the degree of the influence of different
dowrehs on the development of the social behavior and attitu-
des of their members.
One of the observations of many Western social scientists
in Iran is that Iranians show a high degree of the feeling of
insecurity in their social relations. 1 It can by hypothesized
that membership in a dowreh gives the individual an opportuni-
ty for expressive behavior, and it provides the means for his
group assurance of individual worth. Moreover, many of dow-
rehs serve a cathartic function for the members and help the
individual to solve some of his problems.
But the functions of dowreh are not limited to personal
gratification for the members. An important characteristic
of dowreh is important because of its structural location
within the Iranian society. Structurally, the collectivity
of individuals called dowreh, has many sociological functions.
The important questions to be asked in this respect are: why
do not formal institutions and associational groups function
properly in Iran, and therefore, why do such informal group
associations as dowreh assume such major social, psychological
1- See Bill, Zonis and Gable.
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and political roles? Is dowreh a persistent and rigid ins-
titution or is it flexible? What are its functional aspects
in the operation of social and political systems of Iran? Do
these aspects facilitate the process of change and moderniza-
tion or hinder it?
We observed earlier that dowreh is not an isolated phe-
nomenon in Iranian society and that different dowrehs are co-
nnected to each other so that they can form a social network.
In a developing society such as Iran the process of so-
cial organization is not fully developed yet. The formation
of bureaucratic organizations is not complete and the process
of social com-unication is still traditional. It can be hy-
pothesized that the existence of dowreh network, especially
in urban centers, provides many of these functions for Iranian
society. From the isolated small villages where the majority
of population live, to the urban centers in the country, the
social networks of dowreh and other groups, provide the cha-
nnels of social mobility and economic and political exchange.
The individual and his family form alliances with others for
the purpose of mutual assistande. The economic ability of
the individual is a significant factor, since power and wea-
lth are very useful in the building of such alliances. With
the aid of these allies the individual attempts to maximize
his financial and psychological security.
A major consequence of social networks such as dowreh for
the whole society is that it provides benefits for some mem-
bers of all sectors of society, thereby minimizing interclass
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hostility and reducing the bitterness of conflict between
different organized groups.1 This, however, leads to many
other consequences that we shall discuss later.
The communicative aspect of dowreh is clear. The net-
work of dowreh provides the most extensive, informal and eff-
ective channel for diffusion of information. This manner of
communication is particularly effective because it is based
on face-to-face communication. Recent studies on communica-
tion have proved the effectiveness of this form of communica-
tive behavior.
The communicative characteristic of the network of dowr-
eh assumes critical importance when one considers the autho-
ritarian nature of political system in Iran in which not only
the formation of political associations and groups is not po-
ssible, but most of the formal channels of political communi-
cation are controlled by the government.
POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS
Since membership in a dowreh is a group activity, it is
through the group aspect of dowreh that particular individuals
enter into the political system and achieve their specific
goals, it seems proper to review some of the general arguements
and hypotheses of group theory of politics. The theory assu-
mes that individuals act in politics largely as members of
groups.
The group approach to the study of politics was first
1- See Carl H. Lande, "Networks and Groups in South East Asia:
Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics," American
Political Science Review,March 1976
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developed and systematically elaborated by Arthur F. Bentley
in his pioneering work, The Process of Government, published
in 1908.1 Bentley's appraoch was followed by David B. Truman
in his study, The Governmental Process. 2
Bentley defines a group as:
"a certain portion of the men of a society,
taken, however, not as a physical mass cut
from other masses of men, but as a mass ac-
tivity, which does not preclude the men who
participate in it from participating like-
wise in many other group activities." 3
The significance of a group in Bentley's view is its
identification with "interest":
"There is no group without its interest...
As to whether the interest is responsible
for the existence of the group, or the
group responsible for the existence of the
interest, I do not know or care." 4
David Truman's definition of a group is more general:
"Any collection of individuals who have some
characteristics in common." 5
In Truman's view, an interest group is:
"Any group that, on the basis of one or more
shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon
other groups in the society for the establish-
ment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of
behavior that are implied by the shared atti-
tudes." 6
It is clear that despite some contrast in Bentley's and
Truman's definitions, the rature of their views is similar.
1- Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, (Camb: Harvard
University Press, 1967)
2- David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, (New York: Knopf,
1951)
3- Bentley, Op, Cit., P. 211
4- Ibid., P. 212
5- Truman, Op Cit., P. 23
6- Ibid., P. 33
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Thus, an interest group is, first of all, a collectivity of
individuals. Bentley regards it as "a certain portion of the
men of a society", while Truman uses the phrase "collection
of individuals". Second, the essential characteristic of this
aggregate of individuals is the nature of their interaction.
Bentley speaks about "mass of activity" and Truman talks ab-
out"patterns of interaction". Finally, both refer to the po-
int that this collectivity of individuals seeks to act toward
a common goal. This goal can be specific such as pursuing a
particular interest or it can be general such as moving in
certain directions.1
Other political scientists also have developed a typolo-
gy of groups. According to Gabriel Almond, there are four
types of "interest orientation structures" or "interest
groups." 2 These are: associational, institutional, non-asso-
ciational and anomic interest groups.
Non-associational interest groups are those which pursue
their interests informally and possess highly fluid, relative-
ly concealed, and highly personal interaction patterns. 3 Al-
mond and Powell maintain that non-associational interest
groups reflect such distinguishing features as "the intermi-
ttent pattern of articulation, the absence of an organized
procedure for establishing the nature and means of articula-
tion and the lack of continuity in internal structure."4
1- James A. Bill, Robert L. Hardgrave, Comparative Politics,
(Ohio: Charles E. Merill Publishing Co., 1973) P. 121
2- Gabriel A. Almond, Bringham G. Powell, Comparative Politics,
Op, Cit., P. 75
3- Bill, Hardgrave, Op Cit., P. 122
4- Almond, Op, Cit., PP. 76-77
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Examples of this type of groups include kinship, lineage, eth-
nic, regional and status collectivities. According to Almond
and. Powell the influence of such groups is limited in highly
industrialized societies, for two reasons. On the one hand,
organization is highly advantageous for successful interest
articulation in these societies and competition from numerous
organized groups is too great to permit a high degree of su-
ccessful articulation by non-associational groups. On the
other hand, important non-associational groups with continu-
ing interests soon develop organized structures and hence fall
into one of the other classes of interest groups.1
Non-associational interest groups involve two major for-
ms: the infornal group or clique, and categoric aggregations
to which interests are attributed. Racial, ethnic, class and
religious groups are some of the examples.2
As Bill and Hardgrave point out, Almond's typology is
based on a number of highly questionable assumptions. A major
characteristic of many of informal groups such as factions or
cliques is that, unlike categoric group which may have no
organization, they do have organizational structure.3 The
difference, according to Bill and Hardgrave, between associa-
tional and non-associational interest groups resides in the
kind of organization. The organizational characteristic of
non-associational group, for example, incltdes such variables
as personalism, informality and covertness. 4 Moreover, there
1- Ibid.
2- Bill, Hardgrave, Op Cit., PP- 122-3
3- Ibid., P. 124
4- Ibid.
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are numerous instances of non-associational interest groups
in modern, industrialized societies. Cliques, cacuses and
personal coteries of advisers play important roles in modern
societies such as the United States.1
The significance of small groups in politics is well dis-
cussed by Sidney Verba.2 He points out that to understand the
process of government, one must look beyond its formal struc-
tures. According to him, the groups with face-to-face rela-
tionship like families, committees, juries, informal discu-
ssion groups, etc, are basic units of the political system.3
Verba asserts that face-to-face contact can have a grea-
ter effect on opinion and behavior of the individual than
other forms of contact. This process, i.e., the process by
which the individual manipulates the behavior of others or by
which group members bring pressure on the individual, is
called the process of social control. 4 Through social control,
behavior is confined to acceptable limits; limits which maxi-
mize the possibilities of survival for the individual in the
group. Thus, according to Verba, groups influence the opinion
and norms of the group members because of a) the individual
needs that the group fulfills (both affective needs and opi-
nion-evaluations) coupled with, b) the internal pressures and
sanctions that the group places on the non-conforming member.
5
Also, the relation within small, face-to-face groups tend to
be diffuse. This diffuseness gives the small group a
1- Ibid.
2- Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior, (Prince-
ton University Press, 1961)
3- Ibid., P. 17
4- Paul Hare, Op Cit., P. 25
5- Verba, Op Cit., P. 26
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potentiality for influencing individual opinion that larger,
more specifically goal oriented organizations do not have.1
In Verba's view, the face-to-face groups to which an in-
dividual belongs exert a major influence on him. This influ-
ence takes place in two time periods. In the first place,
the primar1 group plays a major role in the political sociali-
zation of the individual before he enters the political proce-
ss. It forms the predispositions that an individual brings
with him into his participation in political affair. Second-
ly, the primary group to which an individual belongs continue
to shape his political behavior after he has begun to partici-
pate in the political process. 2
Within the primary group, Verba observes, the individual
receives training for roles that he will later play within
society. This training consists in both the teaching of cer-
tain standards of behavior that can be applied to later situ-
ations, and the playirg of roles in the family and in other
primary groups that are similar to roles later to be played
in the political or economic system)
Verba confirms the observation that small group experien-
ces in childhood not only provide certain generalized expec-
tations from political relationships, but they also provide
training for participation in these relationships. In his
view, while much of this training takes place within the fa-
mily, but it takes place in other face-to-face situations as
1- Ibid.
2- Ibid., PP. 29-30
3- Ibid., P. 31
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well. Thus, the training for political participation that
takes place in face-to-face groups continues beyond child-
hood and adolescence. 1
Much of the literature that attempt to link childhood ex-
periences and political behavior assumes that the political
system will be congruent with the patterns in the primary
group and will satisfy the needs developed there. But this
assumption is not valid. Similar role experience in primary
groups may lead to quite different political behavior.2
Participation in families, peer groups, work groups and
other formally non-political groups influences the individua-
l's style of political behavior by developing certain skills
for political role-playing. 3
The impact of the face-to-face group relationship on the
political affairs is more direct, and therefore, have a more
specific political content. Verba observes that the explicit
political attitudes with which an individual comes into con-
tact in the face-to-face group have a significant impact on
his political views and behavior. This is especially so in
the light of the strong influence that the primary group has
on the attitudes of its members. However, the influence of
the primary group does not lead to the development of a poli-
tical "personality". The major impact is of a general nature,
and it is more on political attitudes and specific opinions.4
1- Ibid., P. 33
2- Ibid., P. 39
3- Ibid., P. 42
4- Ibid.
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In Verba's view, the relative importance of primary stru-
cture differs from society to society. They are more impor-
tant in traditional societies. This can be considered as a
result of a) the relative weight given to primary and secon-
dary group norms, and b) the relative degree to which politi-
cal functions are performed in primary and secondary struc-
tures. In both traditional and modern societies, primary
groups are significant reference points for norms and attitu-
des. But the loyalty to primary norms is considered to be
more required in traditional societies. If, for instance,
a situation would arise in Japanese politics in which an in-
dividual was caught between conflicting loyalties, he must
consider the prevalent norms of society. In a conflict si-
tuation of loyalty to his political principles and convictions
and his obligations developed in an intimate face-to-face re-
lationship, the dominant norms in Japanese society would re-
quire that the individual fultill his personal, particularis-
tic obligation rather than follow the universalistic criteria
associated with his loyalty to the rules of the impersonal
political system. If he did not follow the norms associated
with his loyalty to an individual, he would be subject to
social disapproval and criticism. 1
Verba describes some general effects that face-to-face
group has on the political system as follows. The face-to-
face group may conflict with larger political system of which
it is a part in several ways. Firstly, the very existence of
1- Ibid., P. 48
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parimary group which have an effect on the political system
may be regarded as a source of conflict with the development
of a rational, efficient system. Secondly, the face-to-face
group may support particular behaviors or attitudes that are
deviant in terms of the norms of the larger system.1
If the particular norms of the system differ from those
of the face-to-face group, the participation in group will be
in conflict with the larger political system. Thus, confor-
mity to the face-to-face group will mean non-conformity to
the norms of the larger system.2 Furthermore, attachment to
face-to-face groups may lessen the impact of the overall po-
litical culture on the individual. However, face-to-face
groups are not necessarily in conflict with the political sys-
tem. They also perform supportive functions. The norms they
support may be norms that are congruent with those of the
larger system. They may supply the individual member with
effective outputs, the absence of which might place burdens
on the political system. Moreover, they are a source of flex-
ibility in running the system.3
One of the major supportive roles played by the primary
groups is the socialization of children to take adult roles
in the political process. Verba offers some hypotheses ab-
out the supportive role of primary groups. A) In so far as
the leaders of the political system can directly penetrate
and control the interaction process within the face-to-face
1- Ibid., P. 49
2- Ibid., PP. 49-50
3- Ibid., P. 54
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group, the norms set by that process tend to support the lar-
ger system. B) The greater the degree of cultural fusion bet-
ween primary and secondary structure, the more the norms of
the small group will support the larger system. C) The more
the face-to-face group perceives itself as participating in
the decisions of the political system, the more the group will
tend to support the norms of the political system. D) The
more the face-to-face group perceives itself as receiving
valued outputs from the political system, the greater will be
its support of the system. 1
1- Ibid., PP. 55-56
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